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A B S T R A C T
We present a new attack  called the snoop-forge-replay attack on the keystroke- 
based continuous verification systems. We perform ed th e  attacks 011 two levels -  1) 
feature-level and 2) sample-level.
(1) Feature-level attack targets specific keystroke-based continuous verification 
m ethod or system. In feature-level attacks, we performed a series of experiments using 
keystroke da ta  from 50 users who typed approxim ately 1200 to 2300 keystrokes of free 
text during three different periods. The experiments consisted of two parts. In the first 
part, we conducted zero-effort verification experiments with two verifiers ( “R” and "S”) 
and obtained Equal Error Rates (EERs) between 10% and 15% under various verifier 
configurations. In the second part, we replayed 10,000 forged im postor a ttem pts per 
user and dem onstrated how the  zero-effort im postor pass rates becam e meaningless 
when im postor a ttem pts were created using stolen keystroke tim ing information.
(2) Sample-level attack is not specific* to any particular keystroke-based contin­
uous verification method or system. It can be launched w ith easily available keyloggers 
and application program m ing interfaces (APIs) for keystroke synthesis. O ur results 
from 2640 experiments show th a t (i) the snoop-forge-replay attacks achieve alarmingly 
high error ra tes com pared to  zero-effort im postor attacks, which have been the  de 
facto standard for evaluating keystroke-based continuous verification systems; (ii) four 
state-of-the-art verification m ethods, three types of keystroke latencies, and eleven
inatd iing-pair settings (-a  key param eter in continuous verification w ith  keystrokes) 
that we examined in this dissertation were susceptible to the attack; (iii) the attack is 
effective' even when as low as 20 to 100 keystrokes were snooped to  create forgeries.
In light of our results, we question the security offered by the current keystroke- 
based continuous verification systems. Additionally, in our experiments, we harnessed 
virtualization technology to generate thousands of keystroke forgeries w ithin a short 
tim e span. We point out th a t  v irtualization  setup  such as the  one used in our 
experiments can also be exploited by an attacker to  scale and speed up the attack.
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C H A PTER  1
IN T R O D U C T IO N
In login tim e verification, the  iden tity  of the user is verified uonce" before 
granting access to  the  com puter. A draw back with login tim e verification is th a t 
an unauthorized user can gain access to  the  com puter by replacing a  legitim ate 
user who is logged in, either through coercion (i.e., forcefully replacing the  user) or 
when the logged-in user leaves the com puter w ithout logging out. This vulnerability 
of login tim e verification is a serious security  risk because, after gaining access, the 
unauthorized user can perform a broad range of malicious activities including installing 
malware, spreading viruses, and (or) exfiltrating/destroying sensitive data. To deter 
this kind of unauthorized access, several studies (e.g., [1 -  5] proposed biometric based 
m ethods to  continuously verify the  identity  of a  logged-in user. A subset of these 
studies used cyber-behavioral tra its (e.g., keystroke dynamics [1 -  4], [6 -  11]; mouse 
dynam ics [12 14]; and web usage p a tte rn s  [15]) to continuously verify users. For
continuous verification, cyber-behavioral tra its  are appealing because they. 1) are non- 
intrusive-they  emerge naturally from a user’s interaction with the computer and user 
intervention is not required when collecting them ; 2) provide broader coverage- th e y  
can be collected on almost all desktops, laptops, and mobile devices without requiring 
any special hardware (e.g.. fingerprint readers, cameras, or biometric scanners); and 3)
1
arc available even when the user is physically away from the computer and is accessing 
it remotely.
Among the  cyber-behavioral tra its , m ajority  of the  studies used keystroke 
p a tte rn s  for continuous verification. Two factors m otivate the  use of keystroke 
patterns for continuous verification: 1) typing is one of the most common activities a 
user perform s on the com puter and therefore, one could expect a  reasonable supply 
of keystrokes for perform ing continuous verification and 2) studies {e.g., [16, 17]) 
dem onstrated tha t an individual’s typing behavior can be used as a unique “signature” 
t.o identify the individual.
Almost all the  studies in continuous user verification w ith keystrokes have 
focused on developing m ethods to  im prove verification perform ance. The focus of 
this research is different. We present a new a ttack  called the “snoop-forge-replay” 
a ttack  on continuous user verification w ith  keystrokes. The a ttack  is executed in 
th ree steps: 1) snoop (steal) a  victim  user’s keystroke tim ing inform ation using a 
keylogger, 2) forge a  typing sam ple using the  keystroke tim ing inform ation stolen 
from the  victim user, and 3) replay the forged typing sample in such a way th a t  the 
continuous verification system thinks th a t it is the victim user who is typing. The goal 
of the attack is to submit forged typing samples to  the verifier so th a t an attacker can 
access the com puter w ithout being detected. Salient features of the  a ttack  follow.
Effective: th rough a  series of experim ents conducted using keystroke d a ta  
from 350 users (150 genuine and 200 im postors), four state-of-the-art continuous 
verification methods, and tem plates built w ith three types of keystroke latencies, we 
show th a t the snoop-forge-replay attacks have alarmingly high error rates com pared
3to the error rates of zero-effort1 impostor attacks typically used to evaluate keystroke- 
based continuous verification systems.
Few words become deadly: the attack is surprisingly effective even when a 
small amount of snooped latencies are used to  build forgeries. W ith 20 characters (few 
words of tex t) to 100 characters (less than  two lines of texts typed in a typical email 
textbox) of snooped information, we achieved high error rates against state-of-the-art 
verification systems. (See Figure 4.7, Page 53 for the error rates of snoop-forge-replay 
attacks launched with short snooped text).
Legacy keystroke sam ples rem ain  a threat: because th e  snoop-forge- 
replay attack uses forgeries built with stolen latencies of a user, the high attack success 
rates can seem to be obvious and expected. However, we snoop the legacy keystrokes, 
which are keystrokes of a  user captured approxim ately  six months  before collecting 
h is/her training (enrollment) samples. Given th a t behavioral tra its  such as keystroke 
latencies have high intra-user variabilities and can change over tim e, it is interesting 
to note th a t our attack  achieves high success ra tes when forgeries are created using 
legacy keystrokes.
Speed and scalability: by using short stolen samples, the  a ttack  can be 
launched quickly as the attacker does not have to wait long to  collect victim s’ keystrokes. 
By exploiting virtualization, we show th a t thousands of a ttacks can be launched to
simultaneously attack hundreds of users in a short tim e span. Using a  v irtualization
Bn a zero-effort impostor attack, the “natural" typing patterns of one user are used as im postor 
a ttem pts against another and the im postor does not deliberately try  to mimic a victim  user.
4setup, we created on average 5594.98 to 299.38 attacks per user in 24 hours. In Table
4.7 on Page 48. we give the average number of attacks per user.
Three factors make the a ttack  feasible: 1) M any hardw are and software 
keyloggers th a t can steal an individual’s keystroke timings are openly available on the 
Internet for different platform s (e.g., MS W indows, G N U /Linux). 2) It is possible 
to develop a "keystroke em ulator” to  replay forgeries. A keystroke em ulator is a 
software program that generates synthetic key press and release events using APIs like 
S end lnpu t [18] for MS Windows or programs like xsendkeycode [19] for X Windows 
system. 3) In sample-level a ttack , the  a ttacker deceives a verification system  by 
presenting fake key press and release events to  the keystroke sensor. To launch 
the attack , the  attacker does not have to  know the internal specifications of the 
continuous verification system , such as w hat verification algorithm  is being used, 
verifier’s param eter settings, how the tem plates are constructed, and latencies being 
used, all of which can be proprietary information.
Contributions of the dissertation are as follows:
In feature-level attack, we perform ed a  series of experim ents on keystroke 
data  collected from 50 users. We show th a t forgeries created from snooped keystroke 
information have alarmingly high impostor pass rates. Our results show th a t a t verifier 
configurations yielding less than  0.1 zero-effort im postor pass ra tes (at <  0.15 false 
reject rate), the success rates of forgery a ttem p ts  is between 75% and 88%
In sample-level attack, we conducted 2640 a ttack  experiments w ith 24 attack  
configurations, 10 individual and fusion verifier configurations, 11 m atching-pair
settings (24x10x11  =  2040) and achieved as high as 125.5 to 2915.62 percentage 
increase in error rates compared to the error rates with baseline zero-effort im postor 
attacks (see Table 4.9. Page 55 and the discussion in Section 4.2.3. Page 48). Our 
results reveal th a t there is a wide disparity in the error rates achieved w ith the zero- 
effort im postor attacks and the  error rates achieved w ith snoop-forge-replay attacks 
(see plots in Figure 4.4, Page 50).
Implication: The high error rates with snoop-forge-replay a ttack s  raise two 
fundam ental questions: 1) is it secure to use keystrokes to continuously authenticate 
computer users? and 2) how can we redesign keystroke-based continuous authentication 
systems that are resilient to forgery attacks?
We analyzed the  effect of four attack  param eters, i) num ber of snooped 
keystrokes-we experimented with 20, 50, 100, 200, 600, and 1200 snooped keystrokes; 
ii) filtering outliers in the  snooped keystrokes-w e experim ented w ith  and  w ithout 
filtering outliers; iii) G aussian pertu rb a tio n  of snooped lateneies-w e experim ented 
with and w ithout perturbing latencies, and iv) frequency of occurrence of digraphs in 
snooped tex t-w e experim ented w ith 1, 2, and 3 occurrences of digraphs.
Findings: Snooping m ore keystrokes from a v ictim  user does not necessarily 
result in be tter attacks. In fact, our results with two verifiers ( “S” and “A” ) showed 
th a t snooping more keystrokes decreased the pass rates of the attacks. We analyzed 
(in Section 4.2.6, Page 56) why snooping more keystrokes may have adversely effected 
the attack performance. Our results also showed th a t filtering outliers in the snooped 
keystrokes and considering digraphs th a t have occurred a t least twice im proved the
6pass rates of the attack. G aussian pertu rba tion  m ade th e  attack  weak against "S" 
and "A" verifiers and had the least effect on TT and " F ' verifiers.
To generate a sufficient number of snoop-forge-replav attacks for evaluation, we 
emulated the typing activity of a victim user for 24 hours {i.e.. we executed a  keystroke 
emulation program  for 24 hours to generate a sufficient num ber of forgeries for each 
victim). Because we experimented with 150 victim users and 24 attack configurations, 
we would have to run the em ulator for 150 (victims) x 24 (attack configurations) x 
24 hours =  3600 days (or approximately 10 years). To perform emulation a t this scale, 
we set up a virtualization environm ent w ith 150 virtual machines. We dedicated one 
v irtual machine for em ulating a victim . For each a ttack  configuration, we ran  150 
em ulators parallely on 150 virtual machines and reduced the em ulation tim e to  just 
24 days. See Section 3.4, Page 29 for details on the  virtualization environment.
A n  attacker can exploit virtualization: By parallely  running 150 v irtu a l ma­
chines. in 24 hours, we forged thousands of a ttacks against 150 users (see Table 4.7, 
Page 48). The attacker, by exploiting virtualization, can further reduce the  tim e to 
forge the same number of attacks, say from 6 to 24 hours, by quadrupling the  number 
of v irtual machines. By increasing the num ber of v irtual machines, the a ttacker can 
also generate a  huge num ber of forgeries {e.g.. in the o rder of millions) or scale the 
attack  to  victimize thousands of users.
We collected keystroke da ta  from 150 users, who gave their typing samples in 
three phases, over a  period of one year. To our knowledge, this is the  longest tim e 
span d a ta  used in continuous keystroke verification research. Using th is  d a ta , we 
dem onstrate th a t  it is possible to  achieve high a ttack  success ra tes w ith keystrokes
7sam ples stolen six months  before the  tra in ing /enro llm ent samples. Tims, our work 
indicates th a t old stolen keystroke sam ples rem ain a  th rea t and an a ttacker can 
potentially exploit stolen keystrokes to  launch forgery attacks over a prolonged period 
of time.
C H A P T E R  2 
B A C K G R O U N D
2.1 C on tin u ou s V erification  w ith  K ey stro k es
In Figure 2.1. we illustra te  continuous user verification w ith  keystrokes. In 
the train ing phase, keystroke latencies are ex tracted  from the enrollm ent tex t and 
processed, users' keystroke* tem plates (profiles) are created, and a verifier (m atching 
algorithm ) is configured. In the verification phase, keystroke latencies are ex tracted  
from the verification text. A verifier matches the latencies against the user’s tem plate 
to  generate a m atch score. In continuous verification, ex tracting  latencies from 
verification tex t and m atching them  against th e  user’s tem plate  is a continuous 
process. Details follow.
K eystrok e  L atencies: Widely used latencies in th e  literature are: 1) key hold 
latency-is the time between press and release of the same key, 2) key press latency-is 
the tim e between press of a key and press of the next key, and 3) key interval latency-is 
the tim e between the  release of a key and press of the next key. We experim ented 
with key hold, key interval, and key press latencies.
T em plate: A tem plate  stores the  keystroke signatures of a  user. We used 
a 26-by-26 m atrix  as the  tem plate. There are 676 cells in the tem plate. Each cell 
corresponds to an English alphabet pair: aa, ab, ac, • • •, zy, zz. In our experiments,
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F ig u re  2.1: Overview of continuous verification w ith keystrokes. In th e  train ing 
phase, keystroke latencies are ex tracted  and outliers are removed. Each in the 
tem plate  represents a cell entry  containing the latency values (and  th e ir m ean and 
standard  deviation) of an English digraph. In th e  verification phase, latencies are 
extracted  as the user types the  verification text. A fter obtaining M  m atching pairs, 
the verifier matches the latencies with the tem plate and outputs a score. A verification 
decision is com puted by thresholding the  score. Based on the  decision, the  user 
is either allowed to  continue or an action is taken. T he perforated  box shows the 
continuous verification loop.
when we used key press (or interval) latencies, each cell in the tem p la te  stored key 
press (or interval) latencies of a le tte r pair. For exam ple, with key press latencies, 
if cell “ab” has {(110,90,100), /iab =  100, crab =  10}, it means th a t  the  user (during 
enrolm ent) typed ab thrice w ith 110ms, 90ms, an d  100ms delay betw een the  press 
of a and the  press of b and the  mean delay is 100ms w ith 10ms s tan d a rd  deviation. 
Similarly, if it were key interval latencies, then  110ms, 90ms, and  100ms would be 
the delays between the release of a and the press of b. Unlike key press and interval 
latencies, a key hold latency by definition is associated w ith a le tte r (and not le tter 
pair). Because our tem plate holds only letter pairs, when we used key hold latencies, 
each cell stored the key hold latencies of the first le tter of its letter pair {e.g.. cell “ab” 
stored key hold latencies of a  only when the  nex t le tte r typed is b). O ur tem plate
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is homogeneous, m eaning it stores only one type of latencies (i.e.. e ither key hold, 
interval, or press), because the continuous keystroke verifiers used in the dissertation 
are not designed to  operate w ith a tem plate containing m ultiple types of latencies 
(e.g.. a m ixture of both  key hold and interval). Because our tem plate does not store 
information on ’'CAPS LOCK’' key, it does not distinguish between capital and small 
letters (i.e., latencies of ab and AB are stored in th e  same cell “ab” ).
O u tlier  D etectio n : Latency values th a t m arkedly deviate from the m ajority 
of the latency values of a user can distort the typing profile of a user, especially if the 
profile contains statistics sensitive to the outliers (e.g., mean). Outliers can occur, for 
example, when users pause while typing to  compose, recollect, or find inform ation. 
Several studies (e.g., [21, 22]) performed outlier detection and reported perform ance 
gains. Therefore, we also included outlier detection in our experim ents. We used a 
distance based outlier detection m ethod th a t worked well in an earlier work [22]. The 
method performs two steps on each non-empty cell in our 26-by-26 tem plate m atrix-1) 
for each latency value in a cell, count the neighbors, i.e., the num ber of latencies in 
the cell th a t occur w ithin a predefined neighborhood threshold (r ) and 2) a  latency 
value is considered an outlier if the  number of neighbors is less th an  a%  of the  to ta l 
number of latencies in the cell. The distance between a  latency value and its neighbor 
is calculated as the absolute difference in latencies. After performing trial experiments, 
we set r  as 100 and a  as 68%. Additionally, we discarded all la tency values greater 
than  300ms.
Verifier: The m ajority of verifiers proposed in the KD literature are password 
or fixed-text based login time  verifiers, i.e., verification is perform ed once when a
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user enters a password or a predefined tex t of fixed length. However, in continuous 
verification with KD. the text of the  user is unconstrained (i.e.. user is free to  type 
anything) and the verifier should be able to  base its decisions on any keystroke tha t 
the user types.
M a tc h in g  P a irs : Because there  are no constrain ts on w hat a  user types 
during continuous verification, some keystrokes typed  during the verification phase 
may not have reference signatures in the tem plate. For example, if the  user types 
“zen ,” the cell in the  tem plate corresponding to th e  le tte r pair “ze” m ay be em pty 
(i.e., may not contain a latency value). This s itua tion  can arise because the  le tte r 
pair did not occur in the enrolment tex t used for building the template. This problem 
can be resolved by performing verification using le tte r pairs that are common to  the 
tem plate and the verification text. Following [1], we refer to  these common letter pairs 
as matching pairs. In our experiments, the number of matching pairs "‘M ” needed by 
the verifier to  ou tpu t a m atch score is a configurable param eter.
K e y s tro k e  V e rif ic a tio n  L o o p : A verification loop (dotted box in Figure 2.1) 
repeats four steps: 1 ) when the user types, record keystroke events using a keylogger, 2 ) 
extract keystroke latencies from the event tim estam ps and process (e.g., filter outliers), 
3) perform verification after collecting M  m atching pairs from the tex t typed by the 
user and obtain a match score, and 4) ou tput the m atch score or make a verification 
decision by com paring the score against a  threshold (T). In a snoop-forge-replay 
attack, instead of typing text (in Step 1 ), the attacker synthesizes keystrokes with an 
emulator.
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P e r fo rm a n c e  M ea su re s : Impostor Pass Rate (IPR) is the ratio of the number 
of impostor attem pts wrongly accepted as genuine over the  total num ber of im postor 
a ttem p ts. False Reject R ate (FR R ) is the  ratio  of the num ber of genuine a ttem p ts  
wrongly rejected over the total number of genuine attem pts. Equal Error R ate (EER) 
is the error rate at which IPR and FR R  are equal. Detection Error Trade-off (DET) 
curves show how IPR s and FARs vary w ith verification threshold. We evaluated the 
snoop-forge-replay attacks using EERs and DET curves.
2 . 2  R e la te d  R e se a rc h
2 .2 . 1  K e y s tro k e -b a s e d  U se r  A u th e n t ic a t io n  S y s te m s
Here, we briefly discuss related research in continuous authentication with KD. 
Monrose and R ubin in [2] proposed a continuous identification m ethod  (i.e., a  test 
sample was matched against all the users’ tem plates to identify the closest user). D ata  
was collected from 41 users over a period of seven weeks. However, because of errors, 
d a ta  from 31 users was used in the  experim ents. Each user typed from a few given 
phrases and /or sentences of their choice. Participants took part in the typing sessions 
a t their convenience using their own com puters. D etails on sam ple sizes (i.e., the 
number of characters typed by the users for enrolment and testing) is not mentioned. 
A user’s tem plate is comprised of means and standard deviations of key hold and key 
interval latencies. Latencies with values greater than T  standard deviations from their 
m eans were trea ted  as outliers and  discarded from the tem plate. A fter discarding 
outlier latencies, the means and standard  deviations were recomputed. Identification 
was done by m atching a  test sam ple (w ith outliers removed) to  the  tem plates of
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all users using: 1) the Euclidean distance m easure. 2) th e  non-weighted probability  
measure, and 3) the weighted probability. The test sample was identified as belonging 
to the user with the minimum distance or maximum probability value. When free (i.e., 
unstructured) tex t was used for enrolm ent and identification, th e  au thors reported  
very low (between 17.1% and 23.0%) identification accuracies. However, when tex t 
from the  given phrases was used, the  au thors reported  90% identification accuracy 
with weighted probability measure.
Dowland et al. in [3] also proposed a continuous identification m ethod. In 
their method, the users typed free (unconstrained) text for enrolment and verification. 
A user’s tem plate  consisted of the  m eans and s tan d ard  deviations for key press 
latencies. Only those latencies th a t occurred a minimum number of times were used to 
build the  tem plate. Latencies outside 40ms and 750ms range were excluded. During 
identification, a key press latency from th e  te st sam ple was considered valid if its 
value was w ithin T .uj s tandard  deviations from m ean value in th e  tem pla te  (ui is a 
weight factor). T he user w ith the highest num ber of valid key press latencies was 
considered as the owner of a given test sample. A total of 10 users participated in the 
d a ta  collection, b u t only four users who gave a large number of samples were used in 
the experiments. Dowland et al. in [3] reported th a t the best identification accuracy 
of their method was 50%. In [3], the authors improved this method and reported close 
to  60% accuracy.
Nisenson et al. in [23] proposed a  continuous verification m ethod. In the ir 
m ethod, each user was trea ted  as an em itter of discrete symbols, i.e., the user em its 
a sequence of key press events, key release events, and tim e differentials, which are
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m apped to a finite symbol set. The tem plate takes the form of a weighted phase tree 
built using the Lempel-Ziv universal prediction algorithm on a user's symbol sequences. 
Verification score was determ ined by calculating the  conditional p robability  th a t  a 
given sequence of sym bols originated from a user's  phase tree. A user was verified 
as genuine if the  probability  estim ate of the  h is /h e r  symbol sequence was greater 
than  a threshold. Although this m ethod achieved 96.77% accuracy, the  accuracy was 
estim ated with only five users (and with d a ta  from a few sessions), which leads us to 
question the reliability of the accuracy.
G unetti and P icard i in [1] proposed a  continuous au then tica tion  m ethod. A 
user’s tem plate consisted of m ean n-graph latencies. A uthentication  was perform ed 
using two measures: 1) the  relative m easure and  2) th e  absolute m easure. The 
relative measure is the normalized rank disorder between n-graph latency pairs th a t 
are common to the tem plate and the test sample. In this dissertation, we implement 
the  relative measure' as one of our baseline verifiers. In the absolute m easure, a 
similarity score is computed between an n-graph in the tem plate and the test sample as 
m ax(D teJnp, D test) / m in(D temp, D test), where D temp and D test are the n-graph durations 
in the tem plate and the  test sample, respectively. If the  ratio  is below a  threshold, 
the n-graph is considered valid. Then the  absolute m easure is com puted as the 
proportion of m atching n-graphs th a t are also valid n-graphs. G u n e tti and P icardi 
perform ed experim ents w ith 40 users (trea ted  as genuine), who provided 15 typing 
samples and 165 users (treated  as impostors) provided one typing sam ple each. Best 
result (IPR:0.044%, FRR:6.833%) was achieved when relative and absolute m ethods 
were combined. However, in order to  achieve these results, th e  m ethod  required
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m ultiple sessions consisting of 700-900 keystrokes. W hen the num ber of keystrokes 
was reduced to l / 4 ,;' original length (approxim ately 2 0 0  keystrokes), the  accuracy 
dropped dram atically (IPR:0.3951%. FRR:29.1667%).
2.2 .2  N o n -zero  Effort A tta ck s on K ey stro k e-b a sed  U ser A u th en tic a tio n
S y stem s
To the  best of our knowledge, th is is the  first work to  propose non-zero 
effort impostor attacks against keystroke-based continuous user verification. The key 
difference between the feature-level att acks in [24] and the sample-level attacks is that, 
sample-level attack  is an au tom ated  attack  (i.e., a  com puter program  continuously 
generates key press and release events as if they were being produced by a legitimate 
user). On the other hand, a  feature level a ttack  recptires the a ttacker to  know w hat 
features the verification system  is using. Additionally, the attacker has to  know how 
to  input the  synthesized features directly into th e  verification algorithm , bypassing 
keystroke d a ta  acquisition, feature extraction, and  preprocessing m odules. Because 
the sample-level attack directly submits (fake) samples to  the verification system, the 
attacker does not have to know the internal details of the  system. So the sample-level 
attack  is more practical and easier to  launch com pared to the feature-level.
Some previous studies in fixed-text (i.e., password) based keystroke verification 
systems used non-zero effort im postor attacks generated by trained human  subjects. 
For example, [25] reported higher im postor pass ra tes  when the  im postor subjects 
were allowed to  observe how a genuine user typed  h is /h e r password. [26] conducted 
experim ents to examine how the  am ount of practice by the  im postor, am ong other 
factors, affected the perform ance of password based keystroke verification system s.
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[26] concluded th a t im postor's practice can be a "minor" th reat to  passw ord based 
keystroke verification systems.
In the papers cited above, trained human im postors had to type short strings, 
containing at most 8  to 12 characters. Therefore, it was possible for a hum an impostor 
to  practice and type like a genuine user. However, in continuous verification, the 
impostor would have to type much more. For instance, in our experiments, to  generate 
one verification attem pt with 20 matching pairs, a user typed on average 54 characters, 
which took 14.83 seconds (see Table 4.5, Page 45). At th is  rate, if the  im postor has 
to  continuously type for five m inutes, he/she would end up typing m ore th an  2 0 0 0  
characters. Typing so m any characters w ith an in ten t to  mimic a  legitim ate user is 
not an easy task for a human impostor. Furthermore, this type of attack is not easily 
scalable because of the hum an effort and resources involved. So, for keystroke-based 
continuous verification system s, im postor a ttacks by tra ined  hum ans do not pose 
as much th rea t as automated forgery attacks, like the  “snoop-forge-replay” a ttack  
presented in this dissertation.
Therefore, there are at least two practical bottlenecks in using human impostors 
against continuous keystroke verification systems: 1 ) how to  train a hum an im postor 
to  consistently type like a legitim ate user for long durations and 2 ) if a t all such 
training is possible, the resources (in time, effort, and monitory costs) needed to train 
the impostors to  launch attacks against larger victim  populations can be prohibitive.
Recently, [27, 28] reported an autom ated im postor attack against short string 
based keystroke verification. In [27] bots inject keystroke events on a client machine in a 
client-server model. The keystroke latencies are statistically-generated and assumed to
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follow Gaussian distribution which are computed by the latencies of a small population 
of 20 users. [27] reported tha t these attacks were ineffective.
In [28] the attack is a guessing attack  that, increm entally searches the feature 
space of a large population of users until a  feature vector th a t m atches the  ta rge t 
user’s tem plate is found. The m aster-key is repeatedly subm itted  to the verification 
algorithm, and every tim e it is subm itted, one of its feature value is changed by one 
standard deviation until the verification algorithm declares that the key has m atched 
the victim ’s tem plate. To speed-up the  attack, instead of changing one feature value 
a t a  time in the master-key, [28] identified conditionally dependent feature pairs and 
changed two feature values a t a  tim e. T he attack  in [28] works against login-tim e 
verification w ith short pass-phrases. However, the  a ttack  is not su itab le  against 
continuous verification because: 1 ) the  a ttack  assum es th a t the tex t is fixed, i.e., 
the  latencies from which the m aster-key is derived and the  tem plates th a t are being 
attacked come from typing the same text, an assumption clearly invalid in continuous 
verification where the users are free to  type any text; and  2 ) the  a ttack  perform s a 
“b ru te  force” search in a  feature space th a t  grows exponentially w ith the  length  of 
the  pass-phrase. Consequently, w ith longer pass-phrases, the a ttack  tends to  m ake 
more erroneous a ttem p ts  (i.e., infertile guesses) before converging to  a  vector th a t 
successfully passes verification. In continuous verification, a verification a ttem p t has 
more characters. For example, in our experiments, verification attem pts had between 
54 characters (with 20 matching pairs) and 2000 characters (with 750 m atching pairs). 
W ith so many characters, the attack in [28] would have m ade thousands of unsuccessful
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attem pts before producing a successful attem pt. W ith so many unsuccessful attem pts, 
a continuous verification system could easily be alerted.
2 .2 .3  N o n -zero  E ffort A ttack s on  O th er  B eh av iora l B io m etr ic  A u th en tic a ­
tio n  S y stem s
The work in th is dissertation was m otivated by the  findings of two studies:
1) [29] studied the  effect of forgery quality  on handw riting  biom etric security and 
showed tha t impostor pass rates of trained and generative {i.e., “algorithmic5') forgery 
a ttacks outperform ed naive forgeries and 2) [30] evaluated spoofing attacks on gait 
au thentication  and showed th a t a ttackers w ith knowledge of their closest person in 
the database can significantly raise impostor pass rates. Below, we briefly discuss [29], 
which is closer to our work in this dissertation.
[29] reported the  effect of six types of forgery a ttack  models on handw ritten  
signature based verification. One of them  was the  generative forgery model, which 
involved algorithmically generating forgeries of a target writer by collecting a small set 
of writing samples from 1 ) the  target w riter (these samples were referred as “parallel 
corpus55) and 2) a set of different writers. Results in [29] showed th a t, com pared to  
trained  hum an forgers, generative a ttacks had higher im postors pass rates for block 
and cursive writers but had lower rates for mixed writers. A notable similarity between 
the generative attacks in [29] and the snoop-forge-replay attack is th a t both  require a 
surprisingly low num ber of stolen samples to  generate effective a tt acks.
CH A PTER  3
S N O O P -F O R G E -R E P L A Y  A T T A C K  M E T H O D S
T he attack  presented in th is d isserta tion  falls under the  broader class of 
generative attacks on behavioral biom etric system s [29], but is tailored to  a ttack  
continuous keystroke-based verification system s. Below, we discuss the  steps in 
snoop-forge-replay attack.
3.1 S n o o p in g  K ey stro k e  T im in g  In form ation
In this step, the attacker secretly steals a victim ’s keystroke tim ing information. 
For example, if the  victim  typed the tex t, “t h i s  i s  snooped t e x t , ” the  a ttacker 
records a series of tim estam p s-P t (tim e when t  was pressed), R t (tim e when t  was 
released), Ph, Rh, P i5 Ri; P s, Rs , P SPAce, Rspace, and so on.
An attacker can snoop a victim ’s keystroke tim ing information using a hardware 
keylogger or a software keylogger. Software keyloggers have become the most popular 
forms of keyloggers because they  can be easily developed, are easily available , 1 and 
can be deployed from rem ote locations onto a  v ic tim ’s machine (e.g., using tro jan s  
and spyware).
'A ttackers can access hundreds of software keyloggers from code-sharing websites like www. 
S o u rceF o rg e .n e t. A nti-Phishing W orking G roup (w w w .an tip h ish in g .o rg ) reported  in [31] th a t 
3121 websites hosted keyloggers in February 2007 alone.
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U ser U ; 
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1
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Record Key P re s s  and 
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E.g.. P ress(h ), 
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F igure 3.1: Snoop-Forge-Roplay attack flowchart.. St,(tp (l)-snoop keystroke timings. 
Steps (2)-(8)-create and replay a forged a ttem pt.
We used keystroke d a ta  collected from 150 participants during the period 13-21 
October 2009 as snooped keystrokes (see Section 3.5 on Page 33 for details). This d a ta  
was collected using a software keylogger developed in C # .  The snooped keystrokes 
were used to attack tem plates that, were built from keystrokes collected approxim ately 
six months after the snooped keystrokes.
3.2  C rea tin g  a K ey stro k e  Forgery
3.2 .1  C reatin g  Forgeries in F eatu re-level A tta ck
For creating a forged attem pt at the feature-level, we assume tha t the attacker
has the following knowledge.
K now s how  to  co m p u te  keystrok e fea tu res  ( i .e . ,  h o ld , in terva l, and  
digraph  la ten cies): An attacker can acquire th is  information by reading keystroke
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dynamics (KD) literature or can use keylogger codes widely published on the Internet. 
For instance, attackers can access hundreds of keylogger codes from code-sharing 
websites like S o u rce F o rg e .n e t.
K n ow s how  to  sy n th es ize  a k eystrok e  featu re from  a p ro b a b ility  
d istr ib u tion : Though we are not aware of any s tudy  th a t conclusively establishes 
that keystroke features follow Gaussian distribution, several KD authentication studies 
have assumed Gaussianality of keystroke features. An attacker can either follow these 
studies or explore distributions o ther than  Gaussian. Flowever, from an a ttack e r’s 
viewpoint, the  Gaussian assum ption is appealing because its param eters (i.e., mean 
and standard deviation) are easy to  compute and m ost programming languages provide 
tools to generate Gaussian variates.
K n ow s how  to  h an d le  ex trem e  fea tu re  values: It is well known th a t the 
mean is sensitive to extreme values. Based on this knowledge, an attacker can choose 
to  discard large feature values before com puting the  m ean. On the  o ther hand, an 
attacker can choose to ignore this step.
For each user £/*, we create forgery a ttem p ts  as follows. We ex trac t digraph 
latencies from TVs snooped keystroke tim ings (see Step 2, Figure 3.1). We assume 
that digraph latencies follow Gaussian distribution. We implement a simple filter that 
discards digraph latencies greater than 300ms (Step 3, Figure 3.1). After filtering, we 
compute the means and standard  deviations of th e  digraphs (Step 4, Figure 3.1).
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3 .2 .2  C reatin g  Forgeries in S a m p le-lev el A tta ck
In this step, we create a keystroke forgery of a victim  user U, at sample-level.
A forgery has two parts: 1 ) '■dummy'’ tex t and 2) a series of latencies betw een the 
press and release of letters in the dummy text. For example, a forgery of Ut can have 
the dum m y tex t, ’‘t h i s  i s  dummy t e x t s ' The key hold and interval values for this 
text come from the  snooped keystroke latencies of Ut.
C o m p u tin g  key  h o ld  a n d  in te rv a l  la te n c ie s  f ro m  17,’s s n o o p e d  k e y s tro k e s : 
Let P t , Rt , Ph, Rh, P i i  Ri,  P s ,  Rs, P s p a c e ,  R s p a c e ,  P i ,  Ri,  and so on be th e  snooped 
keystroke tim estam ps collected when Ui typed  th e  tex t, “t h i s  i s  snooped t e x t . ” 
Using these snooped tim estam ps, the  a ttacker com putes kh t:h =  Rt — P t (key hold 
latency of t ,  when the next character pressed is h), kit;h =  P h — Rt (key interval 
latency between t  and h), khh:i, kih :i, k h i ;s , kii ; s , and so on. If any latency  occurs 
more than once, we take the average. Next, we use the snooped “kh” and “ki” values 
as the key hold and interval latencies of the letters in the dummy text. For example, 
in the forgery containing the dum m y text, “t h i s  i s  dummy t e x t , ” we use kht:h for 
forging the key hold latency of the  first “t ” in th e  dum m y text, and in the  same 
fashion, use kit:h for forging the key interval latency of “t h ” in the dum m y text.
W h a t if  th ere  are le tte r s  in th e  d u m m y te x t  for w h ich  sn o o p ed  
la ten cies are n o t available?: Because our prim ary goal is to  dem onstrate  how 
forgeries based on snooped keystrokes can be used to  evade detection, when preparing 
a forgery, we ignored those letters in the dummy tex t for which corresponding snooped 
latencies were not available. This sometimes could render the tex t generated by the 
forgery linguistically meaningless, especially when forgery is created from  lim ited
am ounts of snooped tex t. However, note tha t current keystroke-based continuous 
verification systems, to the best of our knowledge, do not cheek the language generated 
by the typist, and therefore, our a ttack  in its present form straightforwardly exploits 
this vulnerability.
If the  attacker wants to forge specific words to execute a series of com m ands, 
then  the attacker can choose* to  fill the  missing latencies with very large value's, so 
th a t they are filtered by the outlier detection methoel and  thus are disregarded by 
the continuous verifier. An a lternate  way is to  fill the missing latency values using 
latencies computed from a population of users (as done in [29] for spoofing handw ritten 
signatures).
T able 3.1: Characteristics of the “dummy te x t” file used in our experim ents.
Text Source 497,184 words from COCA corpus and 
20 W ikipedia documents
Total #  of unique letters 26
Total #  of unique digraphs 
(letter pairs) 676
Total #  of letters 5,021,665
Total #  of digraphs 4,222,420
1 0  most frequent letters e, a, i, n, r, o, t, s, 1, d
1 0  least frequent letters q, x, j, z, v, w, k, y, f, b
1 0  most frequent digraphs in, er, an, on, re, ed, te, ar, en, es
1 0  least frequent digraphs qk, jq, qj, xk, jk, qy, qz, vq, qz, qh
P r e p a r in g  a  “du m m y t e x t ” file: The “dum m y tex t” file supplies te x t to 
create a forgery. Technically, the  file can contain any tex t, ranging from m ultiple 
repetitions of a single le tte r (e.g.. a a a . ..)  to  a  large te x t corpus representative of 
English language usage (e.g., Corpus of C ontem porary  Am erican English (COCA) 
[w w w .am ericancorpus.org]). For our experim ents, we created a  “dum m y te x t” file
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with 497.184 words from COCA 2 [32], In addition, we added text from 20 W ikipedia 
documents. (In Appendix A, we give the web addresses of the W ikipedia documents). 
In Table 3.1 we sum m arize the characteristics of dummy text.
3.3  R ep la y in g  a Forgery o f  V ic tim  t/p
3 .3 .1  R ep lay in g  F orgeries in F ea tu re-level A tta ck
Replaying a forged a ttem p t of a user Ut involves generating keystroke tim ing 
events as if U% was typing some tex t. Replaying involves two key com ponents: 1 ) 
a  database containing tex t and 2 ) a “replayer” software, which reads the  te x t in 
the  database and generates keystroke tim ing events. Below, we explain th e  two 
components in detail.
T ext D atab ase: In feature-level attack, to  supply text to the replayer we used 
a file containing F ry’s In stan t W ord List [33], which is a  list of 1,000 m ost common 
words occurring in the  English tex t, arranged in frequency order. Fry F[33] showed 
th a t the first 300 words in this list make up 65% of all w ritten m aterial.
R ep layer  Softw are: A replayer can be im plem ented in two ways: 1) the 
replayer emulates U fs  typing behavior by synthesizing actual key press and release 
events for the tex t in the  database and 2 ) the replayer reads the  tex t and generates 
feature values (e.g., digraph latencies) for user Ux and subm its it to  the verifier.
Generating keystroke feature values: A replayer can replicate U f  s typing 
behavior is by reading tex t from the database and directly supplying keystroke feature
values (digraph latencies in our case) to  th e  continuous verification system. Again,
2COCA is a large, freely-accessible text corpus on the web. The corpus contains 410 million words 
(20 million words each year from 1990 through 2010).
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the feature values can he generated using a Gaussian random  number generator, with 
means and standard  deviations calculated by snooping Ufa  keystrokes.
3 .3 .2  R ep la y in g  F orgeries in S a m p le-lev el A tta ck
K ey stro k e  E m ulator: We developed a  keystroke em ulator th a t  injects 
synthetic key press and release events. We program m ed the em ulator in Visual 
C + +  and used S en d ln p u t API. The goal of th e  em ulator is to  use the  snooped 
latencies to inject key press and release events for the dummy tex t in a way th a t the 
verifier thinks th a t it is the  victim  Ut who is typ ing  the  dum m y tex t. T he em ulator 
algorithm , referred to as “Algorithm 1 ,” gives th e  steps to  forge and replay a victim 
user U js typing pattern.
The input to the  algorithm  is a dum m y tex t file and a series of key hold and 
interval latencies com puted from U js snooped keystrokes. We initialize variables in 
lines 2-9. The trap-counter  variable is used when the program encounters a character 
pair in the dummy text for which a snooped latency is not available. The trap_counter 
variable counts the number of characters to be traversed in the dummy text, to find a 
character pair for which a  snooped latency is available.
In line 10, the w h ile  loop ensures th a t Algorithm 1 replays the dummy tex t for 
a t least 24 hours. In lines 11-26, we create and replay a forgery. The I f  condition in 
Line 14 is executed when a letter pair from the dummy tex t (stored in first and second 
variables) has corresponding snooped latencies. If snooped latencies are available, 
A lgorithm  1 calls the r e p la y  function in line 16 to  generate key press and release 
events. The e lse  in Line 20 is executed if th e  le tte r pair (first, second) does not
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A L G O R I T H M  1: Replay th e  forgery of user ( ',.
In p u t :  D um m y text file contain ing -497.184 words from C O C A  an d  tex t from  20 W ikipedia pages. Key hold (e.g.,
Khn:y . kfly;s p a c e * etc.) and key in terval (e.g.. kim:y. kiy:s p a c e - etc.) latencies com puted  from  U / s snooped 
keystrokes. Hen*. *‘khx:y’‘ deno tes th e  snooped key hold la ten cy  of x w hen the  nex t ch a ra c te r  ty p ed  is y and 
"kiX;y deno tes th e  snooped key in terval latency betw een c h arac te rs  x and  y.
O u tp u t :  A replay  of user ( V s keystroke forgery.
In i t i a l i z a t io n :
n «— N um ber of characters in the  dum m y tex t file.
d u m m yT ex tA rr  [0:n — 1] «— Copy each ch arac te r  in th e  dum m y tex t file in to  th e  array: /* E a c h  cell in the
dum m y Text A rr  holds a character in the  d u m m y  te x t file* /
dum m y Index <— 0: /* Jn d ex  to  the  first character in the  d u m m y T e x tA rr  * /
trap-counter 4— 0: /* C o u n te r  to  ensure th a t character pairs in th e  d u m m y  te x t tha t not do have corresponding
snooped  la tencies do no t s ta g n a te  th e  replay. I f  th e  snooped  la tenc ies are not available even a fte r  traversing  500
characters in th e  d u m m y  tex t, then  ch a ra c te r  p a ir  is reset to  a  random  character in d u m m y T e x tA r r  (L ine  2 5 )* /
first «— 0: /* A  variable to  store  first character.* /
second 4~ 0; /* A  variable to  store second ch aracter.* /
s ta rtT im e  4— System  tim e a t th e  s ta r t  of th e  program :
currentT irne 4— C u rren t system  tim e;
w h ile  ( curren tT irne s ta r tT im e  <  P  ho u rs) /* W e  se t P  to 2 4 -* /  d o
fir s t 4— d u m m yT ex tA rr  [dum m yIndex  ]: 
second 4— f ir s t ;
w h i le  d u m m yln d ex  <  n  and trap-coun ter  <  500 d o
if  (khy;rAt;iSP,.,m,j and kiyt7 s/. s.,,rm„i) is snooped  /^checks if le tte r  p a ir from  the  dum m y te x t has 
co rresponding  snooped la tencies .* / t h e n
E  dyjrxt..second  ^ k h y ^ . sr.cond i E 1 fust--xncorui * kifirst:src.ond' /  Forge latencies. K H  a n d  K I  den o te  
latencies in a  fo rg ery .* /
r e p la y  (first, KHy„.st;.,eron</, K lf t1!>t:A(;Condh / * R ep la y  d u m m y  te x t  by  g en era tin g  k ey  press and  release 
even ts o f  f i r s t  when second  is the  n e x t ch a ra c ter* /
fir s t  4— second: tra p .coun ter 4— 0;
e n d
e ls e
| trap-counter 4— trap .co u n ter  +1; 
e n d
d u m m yln d ex  c— d u m m yln d ex  + 1 ; 
second 4- d u m m yT ex tA rr  [d u m m yln d ex  ];
e n d
d u m m yln d ex  Reset to  a  random  cell of d u m m y T e x tA rr ; 
curren tT irne 4— C urren t system  tim e; trap-counter <— 0;
end
P R O C E D U R E  1: r e p la y ( c h a r  c , r e a l  ho ld -delay , r e a l  in te rv a L d e la y )
I n p u t :  T h e  ch arac te r c to  be replayed, key hold delay of th e  c h arac te r, an d  key interval delay  betw een th e  character 
and th e  next consecutive charac te r.
O u tp u t :  G en era te  press and release even ts for ch aracte r c.
I N P U T  *key; /* fn ia tia lize  key as the  p o in te r  to  I N P U T  s tru c tu re .* /  
key =  n e w  I N P U T :
key -H y p e  =  IN P U T -E E Y B O A R D : / * K eyb o a rd  event. Use th e  “k i” s tru c tu re  o f the I N P U T .* /
key —^ ki.wVk — c; / * Assign  ch arac te r c to  th e  keyboard  e v e n t.* /
key —>ki.dwFlags =  K E Y E V E N T F .E E Y D O W N ; /* T h e  even t is a  key  press e ve n t.* /
Sendlnput (l,& ey ,s iz eo f ( I N P U T ) ) ;  /* P ress  c .* /
s le ep  (hold.delay): /* S Ieep  for hold-delay m illiseconds to genera te  k e y  hold t im e .* /  
key -^k i.dw F lags =  K E Y E V E N T F .K E Y U P ; /* T h e  event is a  k ey  release e v e n t.* /
Sendlnput (l,fce?/,sizeof ( I N P U T ) ) ;  /* R e lea se  c .* /
s le ep  ( in terva L d e la y ); /* S leep  for in tervaLdelay  m illiseconds to g enera te  in terva l tim e .* /
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have corresponding snooped latencies. The trap.counter  ensures th a t if the snooped 
latencies klifirst:»econd and k i/;>.s, j  are not available even after traversing 500 (an 
arbitrarily chosen number) characters in the dummy text, then the f i r s t  and second 
are reset to  a random  character in the d u m m y T e x tA rr  (Line 25).
In Procedure 1, we outline the implementation of the re p la y  function (Line 16 
in Algorithm 1). The function takes three param eters: 1) c is the character key th a t 
has to be pressed and released, 2 ) hold.del ay is the  delay (in milliseconds) between 
the press and release of c, and 3) in tervaLdelay  is the delay (in milliseconds) between 
c and the  subsequent character in the  dum m y tex t. To generate the  key press and 
release events, the  re p la y  function uses S en d ln p u t function (lines 7 and 10), which 
is a part of W indows Application UI Development A PI [18]. The latencies between 
press and release events are generated using the sleep function (lines 8  and 1 1 ).
D e ta ile d  ex p lan ation  o f  lin es 10-27 in  A lgorith m  1: We explain lines 
10-27 w ith an example. Let the  snooped tex t be “t h i s  i s  snooped t e x t ” and 
the dum m y tex t be “t h is  i s  dummy t e x t .” From  line 3, d u m m yT ex tA rr [0] =  t, 
dum rnyTextA rr[  1] =  h, d u m m y T e x tA r r [2] — i ,  d u m m yT ex tA rr[3] — s, and so 
on. From lines 11 and 12, f i r s t  = second = t .  Because d u m m y ln d e x  =  0 and 
trap-counter  =  0, the if  condition in line 14 checks if k h t:t  and kit ; t  are available 
from the snooped keystrokes. Because they are not available (note “t t ” is not present in 
the snooped text) , lines 2 1  and 2 2  in e lse  are executed, resulting in d u m m y ln d e x  —  1, 
second — h, and trap-counter =  1. In the  next ite ra tion , the if  condition in line 14 
checks to  see if khth and kith are available. Because both  khth and kith are available 
from “th ” in th e  snooped tex t, (in Line 15) khth is assigned to  KHth and  kith is
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assigned to KIth. Then, in Line 16. KHth. KIth. and f i r s t  (=  t )  are passed to  the 
r e p la y () procedure. In lines 17 and 18. f i r s t  =  h. dununylridcx  = 2. trap.counter  
is reset to zero, and second =  i .  In the subsequent iterations, f i r s t  takes the values: 
“i , ” “s .” "SPACE." ui , ” “s .” “SPACE,” and correspondingly, second takes the  values 
“s ,” “SPACE.” “i , ” “s ,” “SPACE,” and “D.” In the  next iteration, f  irst  =  SPACE and 
second = D, lines 21 and 22 are executed because khSPACE:D and kiSPACE;D are not 
available from the snooped text. From lines 21 and 22, d u m m y ln d e x  — 9, second =  u, 
and trap.counter  =  1. Because khSPACE:u and kiSPACE:u are also not available from the 
snooped tex t, lines 2 1  and 2 2  are again executed, resulting in d u m m y ln d e x  =  1 0 , 
second = u, and trap.counter  =  2. Lines 21 and 22 are executed in the  next 
few iterations, each tim e increm enting the  trap .counter , until second  =  t .  Because 
khSPACE:t and kiSPACE:t are available from the snooped latencies, lines 15-18 are executed. 
In this fashion, A lgorithm  1 continues to  execute for 24 hours. The final o u tp u t of
Algorithm 1 is the replay text: t h i s  i s  t e x t ............
At this point, we emphasize th a t Algorithm 1 is one of the many  possible ways 
to generate snoop-forge-replay attacks. While maintaining the general idea of snooping 
and replaying the keystrokes, the attacker can evolve Algorithm 1 in several ways. For 
example, the attacker can devise heuristics to im pute missing latency values or snoop 
only selected latencies from a victim, to generate desired tex t or system  commands.
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3 .4  V ir tu a liza tio n  S et-u p  for Forging and  R ep la y in g  S am p le-level A tta ck s
on a L arge Scale
To launch a large number of a ttacks on 150 victim users (see C ontribution 3. 
Page 2). we built a virtualization set-up a t Louisiana Tech University's Cyber Security 
Laboratory. The set-up had 150 virtual machines (VMs). Each VM ran a  copy of our 
keystroke em ulator program  (i.e.. A lgorithm  1) to  generate forgeries for one victim  
user.
To create th e  v irtualization set-up, we used a  cluster of 8  Dell PowerEdge 
M710 Blade servers, each w ith 12 core Intel Xeon 3.33GHz processors. Each server 
was equipped w ith 96GB main memory. Four Dell EqualLogic iSCSI storage arrays 
provided 20TB secondary memory. We used VMware 4.1 vSphere Suite [34] to create 
150 VMs. Each VM had W indows X P 32-bit operating system, 2GB m ain memory, 
and 10GB secondary storage. In each VM, emulator and “notepad.exe” file (to create 
an  active N otepad window for S end lnpu t A PI) were executed using Powershell 2.0 
scripts. We used Condor 7.6.0 software [35] to  schedule th e  execution of Powershell 
scripts in 150 VMs, simultaneously.
The keystroke em ulator takes snooped tim ing information and “dum m y te x t” 
file as input, injects key press and release events, and outputs a file containing replay 
tex t. W hen the em ulator was running, we used a software keylogger to  record the 
synthetic keystroke events generated by the  em ulator. T he keylogger recorded the 
keystroke events and stored them  in “useriV .txt” files (where N  = 1 to 150). A to ta l 
of four files were associated w ith each user: two input files, one containing snooped 
keystroke tim ing inform ation and another containing dum m y tex t), and two output
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files (i.e.. the text file generated by the em ulator and "user.V .txt" recorded by the 
keylogger). A fter running the  em ulator for 24 hours, the  "userA ktxt” (N  =  1 to 
150) files were collected from Condor server's shared memory and passed through the 
verifiers to generate verification scores.
3.5 K eystrok e  D a ta  C o llec tio n
We used keystroke d a ta  collected from 350 partic ipan ts a t Louisiana Tech 
University. M ajority  of th e  partic ipan ts were studen ts, bu t university faculty and 
staff also partic ipated . We used six Pen tium  IV desktop PC s to  collect keystroke 
data. The PC s were equipped with W indows X P OS, a Q W ERTY  keyboard, and a 
mouse. On each PC , we installed an in teractive keystroke d a ta  collection software 
developed in C # . Additionally, we used two laptops to register participants and collect 
voluntary inform ation (such as gender, ethnicity, typing experience, native language, 
is the  participant left- or right-handed, is the  partic ipan t willing to  partic ipa te  in a 
future d a ta  collection effort, and the p a rtic ipan t’s university email address).
We collected data during three different periods: October 13-October 21, 2009; 
April 4-April 30, 2010; and 25 October-9 November, 2010. On all days, we sta rted  
da ta  collection at approximately 8:00 AM and concluded at 5:00 PM. Each participant 
was required to  register by presenting h is /h e r university ID card. We recorded the 
following information during registration: 1) first name, 2) last name, and 3) voluntary 
information. We used two popular locations in the university to set up d a ta  collection 
booths. At each location, we used three PC s for collecting keystroke samples. We
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continued da ta  collection during lunch hours (11:30 PM to  1:30 PM ) as this was the 
period of heightened studen t/facu lty  traffic.
A fter registration, we instructed  each p artic ipan t on how to  use the  d a ta  
collection software and asked the  partic ipan t to  type three types of tex t: 1 ) fixed 
text participant typed the phrase “I am an u n d e rg ra d u a te  s tu d e n t  o f L o u is ia n a  
Tech U n iv e r s i ty ” 15 tim es (12 tim es during O ctober 2009); 2) copy text-each 
partic ipan t typed several paragraphs of English tex t from a docum ent provided 
by us; and 3) self text-partic ipan t had to  com pose and type tex t. Unlike in fixed 
tex t, where the partic ipan t had to  type th e  predefined tex t exactly, there  were no 
restrictions on typing copy and self texts. For example, the participants were allowed 
to  make spelling m istakes and typographical errors, and if they chose, they  could 
correct them  using Backspace or Delete keys. In the experiments, we do not use fixed 
tex t data, so we skip further details on it. For entering fixed tex t, the  GUI included 
three text boxes: one for entering username, one for entering campus-wide ID number, 
and one for entering a common fixed phrase.
The keystroke d a ta  collection software provided GUI (e.g., tex t boxes, buttons, 
and character counters) for typing copy and self texts. Each participant was required to 
type at least 1800 characters (1200 during October 2009) of copy text. For typing copy 
text, we provided paper copies of sample tex ts to the  participants. We used five sample 
texts: 1 ) D eclaration of Independence [36], 2) a  transcrip t of R ichard  H am m ing’s 
“You and Your Research” speech [37], 3) th e  first 2100 words in C hap ter 1 of David 
Copperfield [38], 4) the first 2000 words in C hapter 1 of Samuel Johnson [39], and 5) 
the first 1900 words in C hapter 1 of Walden [40]. A participant received one of the five
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T ab le  3 .2 : A summary of keystroke data usage in our sample-level a ttack  experiments.
DaUuset
Nam e S e t  I S e t  I I S e t  I I I S e t  IV
C ollection
D ates
13 21 O ct., 
2009
4 30 A pril. 
2010
25 O ct.
9 N ov..2010
25 O ct.
9 N ov..2010
Usage Snoopedkeystrokes
B uilding
keystroke
tem p la tes
G en era tin g  genuine 
V zero-effort 
im pstr. scores
G en era tin g  
zero-effort 
im pstr. scores
#  of users 150 com m on users in se ts  I. 11. an d  III 200 new users
sample texts randomly. As the participant typed, the software displayed the num ber of 
characters typed. Copy text d a ta  collection process ended when the participant typed 
a t least 1800 (1200 during O ctober 2009) characters. A fter entering the  copy tex t, 
the partic ipan t was required to  type abou t 300 characters of self tex t. A fter typing 
the self tex t, the  participant pressed the  “Finish” b u tto n  and ended h is /h e r d a ta  
collection session. Self tex t was collected during April 2010 and O ctober-N ovem ber 
2 0 1 0  periods.
Copy vs. self text: W hen perform ing activities like writing emails, messaging, 
and word-processing, users typically do com positional typing (i.e., tex t composition 
and typing occur as an intertw ined sequence of events). Thus, typ ing  self tex t is a 
closer representation of a  user’s typing activity. However, we conducted pilot trials in 
our laboratory before undertaking full-scale d a ta  collection and observed th a t typing 
1200-1800 characters of self tex t took considerably more time th an  typing copy text 
of the same length and in most cases fatigued participants. Because the  m ajority  of 
the partic ipants were students who partic ipated  between classes, tim e was a critical 
factor for their participation. To achieve a trade-off between partic ipa tion  tim e and 
obtaining realistic typing samples, we choose to  collect a m ixture of copy and self 
texts.
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K e y s tro k e  D a ta  U sag e  in  O u r  E x p e r im e n ts
1) F o r fe a tu re - le v e l a t t a c k  e x p e r im e n ts :  we used data from 50 users who 
participated during three data  collection periods, i.e.. October 2009, April 2010, and 
O ctober-Novernber 2010. We used keystroke events generated by typ ing  free and 
self tex ts during April 2010 for tra in ing  (i.e., building keystroke tem plates). For 
generating verification attem pts, we used keystrokes from free and self tex ts collected 
during October-November 2010. We used the keystroke events obtained from typing 
free text during O ctober 2009 as snooped keystroke data.
2) F o r sam p le -lev e l a t t a c k  e x p e r im e n ts :  we divided the  keystroke d a ta  
into four sets (see Table 3.2). Set I has keystrokes collected from 150 users during 
O ctober 2009. For the  same 150 users, Set II has keystrokes collected during  April 
2010 and Set III has keystrokes collected during O ctober November 2010. We used 
keystrokes in Set I as snooped keystrokes. We used keystrokes in Set II to  build 150 
user tem plates. We used keystrokes in Set III to  generate  genuine and zero-effort 
im postor scores. To generate genuine scores, we m atched each user’s tem p la te  w ith 
h is/her own keystrokes in Set III. To generate zero-effort impostor scores, we matched 
a user’s tem plate with keystrokes of 149 rem aining users in Set III.
P u r p o s e  o f  S e t IV : Set IV contains keystroke samples from a  new pool of 
200 users who are not present in sets I, II, and III. We matched keystrokes in Set IV 
against the user tem plates to generate additional zero-effort impostor scores. We did 
this to compare the snoop-forge-replay attack scores with two baselines: 1 ) zero-effort 
impostor scores generated w ith Set III, and 2 ) zero-effort impostor scores generated 
with Set IV.
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Note from the "Collection Dates" row in Table 3.2 that there is approximately 
six months time gap between snooped keystrokes (Set I) and keystroke used to  build 
tem plates (Set II). T his m anner of d a ta  usage is akin to  a scenario in which the 
attacker uses old ‘‘legacy'" keystrokes to attack  a  victim user's tem plate.
3.6 B a se lin e  (Z ero-effort Im p o sto r  A tta ck ) E x p erim en ts  
For fea tu re-lev el a ttack  ex p er im en ts: we experimented with two verifiers: 
1) Relative (R) verifier [l], and 2 ) Similarity (S) verifier. We used one type of tem plate: 
T K P -tem pla te  containing key press latencies.
For sa m p le-lev e l a ttack  ex p erim en ts: we experimented with four  verifiers: 
1) Relative (R) verifier [1], 2 ) Absolute (A) verifier [1 ], 3) Similarity (S) verifier [41], 
and 4) Fusion (F) verifier. We used three types of tem plates: 1) T K H -tem p la te  
containing key hold latencies, 2) T K I-tem plate  containing key interval latencies, and 
3) T K P -tem plate  containing key press latencies. This resulted in nine verifier-template 
combinations i.e., (R, TKH), (R. TK I), (R, T K P ), (A, TK H ), (A, TK I), (A, T K P ), 
(S, TKH), (S, TKI), and (S, TKP). The "F” verifier fuses the outputs from (R, TKH), 
(R, TKI), (S, TKH), (S, TKI), and (A, T K P) using the weighted sum fusion rule [42], 
E x tra ctin g  verification  a ttem p ts: From  a u ser’s typing sam ple, we ex­
tracted verification attem pts as follows: 1 ) read the text in the order it was typed and 
extract latencies until M  matching pairs are obtained; 2) present the Al  m atching pairs 
to the verifier to obtain a verification score (this constitutes one verification attem pt);
3) read the  tex t from the point where it was stopped in Step 2 until Al  m atching 
pairs are obtained; and 4) repeat Steps 2 and 3 until the  text ends. This procedure
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partitions the tex t into contiguous, non-overlapping, variable-length windows, each 
containing exactly M  m atching pairs. Each window corresponds to one? verification 
attem pt. We experimented with M  values: 20, 40. 60. 80. 100. 120. 150, 300, 350, 500, 
and 750.
R e la tiv e  (R ) a n d  A b so lu te  (A ) V e rif ie rs  [1]: Given a verification attem pt, 
‘R ': verifier outputs a score as follows. Two arrays Atra jn and are constructed,
^ tra in  cont ains the m atching pairs ranked in ascending order of their corresponding 
m ean latencies (in the tem plate). A^est contains the  m atching pairs ranked in 
ascending order of their latencies in the  verification a ttem p t. T he "R” m easure 
between A^rajn and is com puted as the norm alized array disorder between
^ tra in  an<  ^ ^ te s t-  The “R ” measure lies between 0 and 1 , 0 (or 1 ) indicates a  perfect 
m atch (or mismatch) between the verification a ttem p t and the tem plate.
T he “A ” m easure verifier ou tp u ts  a score as follows: for each m atching pair, 
two latency values are considered: 1 ) the average latency value stored in the tem plate, 
and 2) the  average latency value in the  verification a ttem p t. T he larger of the  two 
is divided by the smaller. A m atching pair becomes valid, if the ratio  falls between 1 
and a threshold (after some trial and error experiments, we choose 1.45 as threshold). 
The “A” measure is given as
 ^ number of valid m atching pairs 
to tal num ber of m atching pairs
The “A” measure of 0 (or 1 ) indicates a perfect match (or mismatch) between
the verification a ttem pt and the tem plate.
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S im ila r ity  (S) V e rifie r [41]: The "S’: verifier outputs a verification score as
follows: each matching pair in the verification attem pt is considered a valid m atching
pair if it falls within T (=  1) s tandard  deviations from its corresponding mean in the
tem plate. The similarity measure between the  tem plate and the verification a ttem pt
is calculated using (3.1).
F u s io n  ( “F ” ) V erifie r: The1 verifier fuses ou tpu ts  of five verifier-tem plate
com binations, (R, TK H ), (R, TK I), (S, T K H ), (S, TK I), and (A, T K P ), using the
weighted fusion rule. If s2, s4, and s 5 are ou tpu ts of the five verifier-tem plate
com binations, then  by the  weighted fusion rule, “F ” ou tpu ts cuiSi T- U2 S2  +  CU3 S3 +
5
CO4 S4  -I- CU5 S5 , where 0.1 < Ui < 0.6 and =  1. We included weighted fusion
1 = 1
in our experim ents because studies (e.g., [42, 43]) show th a t it perform ed well in 
biom etric au then tication  tasks. For fusion, we used five out of th e  nine available 
verifier-tem plate com binations because key press latencies are formed by adding key 
hold and key interval latencies, so including (R, T K P ) and (S, T K P ) do not bring 
new inform ation when (R, T K H ), (R, T K I), (S, TK H ) and (S, T K I) are already 
included in the fusion. The “A” verifier was prim arily designed for key press latencies, 
so we included only (A, T K P ) in the  fusion. Choosing weights: we experim ented 
w ith 126 weight com binations. Initially, we set cu* =  0.1, i = 1, • • • ,4  and u 5  = 0.6. 
Then we incremented (or decremented) the weights in 0.1 units under the constraints:
0 . 1  <  ujx <  0 . 6  and Yli=i =  1 -
C H A PTER  4
R E SU L T S
4.1 F ea tu re-leve l A tta ck  E x p erim en ts
4 .1 .1  B a se lin e  (Zero-efFort Im p o sto r  A tta ck ) R esu lts
We perform ed baseline experim ents to  find the  optim al num ber of m atching 
pairs (M )  th a t yield the lowest FRR and IPR  values. The DET curves of "R” verifier,
i.e., plots 4.1(a)-4.1(b) and ;‘S" verifier, i.e., plots 4.1(c)-4.1(d) (in Figure 4.1) show 
th a t lower F R R  and IP R  values are achieved w ith high M  values (i.e., 300, 350, 
500, and 750). However, a high M  requires typ ing  m ore keystrokes to  generate a 
verification attem pt, which ultim ately increases th e  time, to  output a m atch score. In 
our experim ents, it took on an average of 49.36 keystrokes (14.305 seconds average 
typing tim e) to  obtain  a verification a ttem p t w ith  20 m atching pairs  and 1836.42 
keystrokes (545.307 seconds average typing time) to  obtain a verification a ttem pt with 
750 m atching pairs. Therefore, a trade-off exists betw een the num ber of m atching 
pairs and the verification delay. DET curves for 20, 40. 60, and 80 m atching pairs (not 
shown due to space constraints) had higher EERs than  the DET curves in Figure 4.1.
In Table 4.1, we give the  num ber of genuine and im postor a tte m p ts  used for 
generating DET curves in Figure 4.1. In our test data, on an average there were 2100 
keystrokes per user. So, for high M  values like 750, 500, and 350, on average, we
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Table 4.1: Total genuine a ttem pts (#G ). genuine a ttem pts/user (G / U ). and impostor 
a ttem pts/u ser ( I /U )  used in Figure 4.1 DETs.
M 100 120 150 300 350 500
# G 570 473 371 175 141 94
G /U 11.4 9.46 7.42 3.50 2.82 1.88
I /U 555.3 456.8 360.8 168.6 140.1 90.3
needed 183(1.42. 1212.42, and 853.69 keystrokes respectively to generate a verification 
a ttem pt. For th is  reason, we had very few genuine a ttem p ts  for each user when M  
was high (Table 4.1, second row). However, we did not have this problem for impostor 
attem pts because, for each user, we used the keystroke d a ta  of the rem aining 49 users 
to generate im postor attem pts.
4.1 .2  S n oop -forge-rep lay  A tta ck  R esu lts  an d  A n a ly sis
In this section, we dem onstrate the success rates of forged verification attem pts 
created from snooping a user’s keystroke data. We choose to  use M  values w ith 
baseline EERs less than  0.15. Figure 4.1 shows th a t  th is is achieved w hen M  is 150, 
300, 350, 500, and 750 for bo th  verifiers. However, we excluded 750 m atching  pairs 
because the average number of keystrokes it required to generate a verification attem pt 
(1836.42) was too  high to  be realistic. Verification threshold for each M  value was 
selected using two heuristics: 1) threshold T) w ith the least I P R  when F R R  <  0.15 
and 2) threshold T2 for which F R R  + I P R  is minimum (i.e., lowest point in the DET 
curve) when F R R  <  0.15. In Table 4.2, we give th e  baseline (zero-effort) IP R s for 
verifiers “R” and “S” for thresholds T\ and T2.
T he plots in Figure 4.2(a), 4.2(c), 4.2(e), and 4.2(g) show the  percentage of 
successful forgery a ttem p ts  w ith threshold T\ (see Table 4.2). We considered two
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F igure 4.1: Baseline DET curves of “R" (a) & (b) and “S” (c) & (d ) verifiers w ith 
M  matching pairs.
factors: num ber of snooped keystrokes and filtering (no filtering) snooped digraph 
latencies greater than  300ms. W hen forged a ttem p ts  were created by estim ating  the 
means and s tan d ard  deviations of digraph latencies and  replayed using a  G aussian 
random  num ber generator, we observe (in p lots 4.2(a) and 4.2(e)) th a t  filtering 
increases the percentage of successful forged attem pts. W ith “S” verifier, the maximum 
percentage of successful forgeries w ith filtering was 87.58 (for M =  150 and 200 snooped 
keystrokes) and 72.06% (for M  = 150 and 150 snooped keystrokes) w ithout filtering. 
W ith R verifier, the maximum percentage of successful forgeries was 79.32 w ith filtering 
(for M  = 500 and 200 snooped keystrokes) and 72.73% (for M  =  500 and 100 snooped 
keystrokes) w ithout filtering. For these  M  values, in plots 4.2(b) and 4.2(f), we 
compare baseline DET curves obtained with zero-effort impostors and the D ET curves
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F igu re 4.2: (a ,c ,e ,g ):  Percentage of successful forged a ttem pts w ith  threshold  
T\; (b , d , f , h ): Com parison of EERs generated  w ith  zero-effort im postors (baseline) 
and forged verification a ttem p ts  generated  by estim ating  the m eans and  s tan d ard  
deviations of snooped digraph latencies (b, d ), and by estim ating the means of the top 
10 frequent snooped digraphs (f . h ).
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obtained  w ith forged a ttem p ts  (with 200 and 150 snooped keystrokes). The D ET 
curves clearly show th a t forged a ttem pts considerably increase the  baseline EERs.
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F igu re 4.3: Com parison of EERs of “R” verifier with forged verifications a ttem p ts 
generated w ith 50 and 150 snooped keystroke when M  =  500.
In “S” verifier, the  percentage of successful forgeries increased as the  num ber 
of snooped keystrokes increased from 50 to  150 and then began to decrease from 200 
to  1200. Though less pronounced, the sam e behavior was observed w ith “R .” The 
observation th a t snooping more keystroke inform ation makes the  forgery a ttack  less 
effective is counter-intuitive. The reason behind th is phenomenon is th a t the frequency 
of occurrence of English digraphs follow' heavy-tailed (Pareto-like) distributions, 
im plying th a t only a  few digraphs occur m ost of the time. In fact, [33] showed 
th a t 25 digraphs make about third of all printed English text. As more keystrokes are 
snooped, the frequencies of only a few digraphs are sufficient enough to  estim ate the 
m ean /s tan d a rd  deviations, and for the rem aining digraphs, the  frequencies are too 
low to  estim ate the  m ean s/s tan d ard  deviations correctly. Therefore, increasing the 
number of snooped keystrokes increases the number of badly estimated m eans/standard  
deviations used to forge a sample. To support our argument, we created forged samples
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T a b le  4 .2: IPRs of verifiers ;R ' and "S" for thresholds 7) and T2.
M Ti “R ” T2 “R ” Ti «g» T -2 “S”
150 0.118167 0.138081 0.152123 0.138153
300 0.109109 0.128045 0.124451 0.124451
350 0.115047 0.127630 0.080491 0.112174
500 0.102082 0.123187 0.085271 0.099889
using means estim ated from the 10 most frequently occurring digraphs (and set the 
s tandard  deviation to  zero, i.e., created the  forgeries using only the  m ean digraph 
latencies). P lo ts 4.2(c) and 4.2(g) show a clear im provem ent in th e  success ra tes of 
forgery a ttem p ts  when the  num ber of snooped keystrokes increase from 200-1200. 
We also compare the baseline D ET curves obtained  w ith zero-effort im postors when 
M  =  500 and the D ET curves obtained w ith forged a ttem pts created using only the 
means of the top 10 m ost occurring snooped digraphs (with 1200 and  800) snooped 
keystrokes. The D ET curves clearly show th a t forged attem pts considerably increase 
the baseline EERs.
In Figure 4.3(a) we com pare the  baseline (zero-effort) EE R s of “R ” verifier 
(M  =  500) w ith EERs of forged im postor a ttem p ts  created by estim ating  the means 
and standard  deviations of digraph latencies (p lo t 4.3(a)) and w ith forged a ttem p ts  
created by estim ating the  m eans of the  top  10 m ost frequent d igraphs (plot 4.3(b)). 
The plots confirm th a t forged a ttem p ts  created  by estim ating th e  m eans of the  top 
10 m ost frequent digraphs have higher EERs. Additionally, we also p lo tted  forgery 
success ra tes w ith the threshold T2 (not shown due to space constrain ts). T he plots 
w ith T) were similar to  Figure 4.2 and offered no new insights.
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T ab le  4 .3: EERs generated for 150 users, with Set II as the training d a ta  and Set III 
as the verification data. The lowest EERs in each verifier group are m arked in b o ld .
M R S A F u s i o n  ( F )KI K P  j KH KI K P K H KI | K P K H L o w e s t  E E R p - A v g .  E e R f S T D p
20 0  2 3 5 0 . 2 0 9 0 .22 0 . 2 2 7 0 .251 0 . 3 4 5 0 . 3 3 0 0 . 2 6 5 0 . 3 2 9 0 .1 4 9 0 . 1 6 9 0 . 0 1 6 5
40 0 . 1 8 5 0 . 2 4 0 0 .1 5 5 0 . 1 8 0 0 . 2 1 2 0 . 3 2 5 0 . 3 0 2 0 . 2 3 2 0 . 3 0 0 0 .1 0 5 0 . 1 2 5 0 . 0 1 8 9
0 0 0 .1 0 0 . 2 2 4 0 . 1 4 3 0 . 1 0 5 0 .191 0 3 1 7 0 . 2 9 3 0 . 2 1 8 0 . 3 0 3 0 .0 8 9 0 . 1 1 3 0 . 0 1 9 6
80 0.1 53 0 . 2 0 0 0 . 1 3 2 0 . 1 5 8 0 . 1 7 7 0 .31  1 0 . 2 7 4 0 . 2 0 9 0 . 2 9 4 0 .08 0 . 1 0 5 0 . 0 1 9 8
100 0  143 0 . 1 9 0 0 .12 0 .1 5 1 0 . 1 0 9 0 .31 0 . 2 0 0 0 .2 0 . 2 8 8 0 .0 7 2 0 . 0 9 8 0 . 0 2 1 7
120 0 .141 0 . 1 8 7 0 . 1 1 7 0 . 1 4 5 0 . 1 0 5 0 . 3 0 7 0 . 2 6 2 0 . 1 9 6 0 . 2 8 6 0 .0 6 9 0 . 0 9 6 0 . 0 2 1 6
150 0 .131 0 .1 7 1 0.11 0 . 1 3 7 0 . 1 5 0 0 . 3 0 0 0 . 2 5 2 0 . 1 9 5 0 . 2 8 5 0 .0 6 7 0 . 0 9 2 0 . 0 2 1 1
30 0 0  123 0 . 1 5 5 0 .1 0 5 0 . 1 2 4 0 .1 4 1 0 . 3 0 7 0 . 2 4 6 0 .1 9 1 0 . 2 7 5 0 . 0 5 6 0 . 0 8 3 0 . 0 2 0 9
3 5 0 0 . 1 1 7 0 . 1 0 0 0 .1 0 4 0 .1 3 1 0 .131 0 . 3 0 8 0 . 2 4 8 0 . 1 9 2 0 . 2 7 3 0 .0 4 3 0 . 0 6 9 0 . 0 2 5 9
50 0 0 . 1 1 0 0 . 1 5 5 0 . 1 0 3 0 . 1 3 2 0 . 1 2 0 0 . 2 8 8 0 . 2 4 7 0 . 1 8 7 0 . 2 5 8 0 .0 4 2 0 . 0 8 6 0 . 0 2 7 7
75 0 0 .1 2 4 0 . 1 3 5 0 .1 0 5 0 . 1 3 2 0 . 1 3 9 0 . 2 8 2 0 . 2 3 4 0 . 2 0 6 0 . 2 6 4 0 . 0 3 2 0 . 0 8 4 0 . 0 1 8 9
T a b le  4 .4 : EERs generated for 200 users. Set II was used for tra in ing , Set III was 
used for generating genuine a ttem pts, and Set IV for generating im postor a ttem pts.
M R S A F u s i o n  ( F )K I K P K H KI K P K H K I K P K H L o w e s t  E E R p A v g .  E E R F S T D p
20 0 . 2 3 2 0 . 2 9 6 0.2 0 . 2 1 8 0 . 2 3 9 0 . 3 4 0 .3 3 1 0 . 2 5 5 0 . 3 1 5 0.141 0 . 1 6 9 0 . 0 1 6 5
4 0 0 . 1 7 9 0 . 2 4 3 0 . 1 4 6 0 . 1 7 8 0 .2 0 1 0 .3 2 1 0 . 2 9 6 0 . 2 2 2 0 . 2 9 3 0 .0 9 9 0 . 1 2 2 0 . 0 1 8 6
6 0 0 . 1 5 5 0 .2 2 1 0 .1 2 3 0 . 1 5 8 0 . 1 8 0 . 3 1 3 0 . 2 8 7 0 . 2 0 7 0 . 2 8 9 0 .0 8 4 0 . 1 0 7 0 . 0 1 9 4
8 0 0 . 1 4 7 0 . 2 0 3 0 . 1 1 3 0 . 1 5 0 . 1 6 6 0 . 3 0 7 0 . 2 6 7 0 .2 0 . 2 7 9 0 .0 7 6 0 . 0 9 9 0 . 0 1 9 6
100 0 .1 3 5 0 . 1 9 2 0 . 1 0 6 0 . 1 4 3 0 . 1 5 8 0 . 3 0 6 0 . 2 5 9 0 . 1 9 2 0 . 2 7 6 0 .0 6 8 0 . 0 9 4 0 . 0 2 1 2
120 0 .1 3 3 0 . 1 8 4 0 .101 0 . 1 3 7 0 . 1 5 6 0 . 3 0 3 0 . 2 5 5 0 . 1 8 9 0 . 2 7 6 0 .0 6 7 0 . 0 9 2 0 . 0 2 1 3
150 0 . 1 2 3 0 . 1 6 7 0 . 0 9 7 0 . 1 3 0 . 1 4 7 0 . 3 0 4 0 . 2 4 4 0 . 1 8 6 0 . 2 7 2 0 .0 6 3 0 . 0 8 8 0 . 0 2 0 9
3 0 0 0 . 1 1 5 0 . 1 4 9 0 . 0 8 8 0 . 1 1 6 0 . 1 3 4 0 . 3 0 2 0 . 2 3 6 0 . 1 8 3 0 . 2 6 3 0 .0 4 8 0 . 0 7 6 0 . 0 2 1 1
3 5 0 0 .1 1 2 0 . 1 5 2 0 . 0 8 7 0 . 1 2 4 0 . 1 2 2 0 . 3 0 2 0 . 2 4 9 0 . 1 8 0 .2 6 0 .0 4 4 0 . 0 6 7 0 . 0 2 4 8
5 0 0 0 .1 1 2 0 . 1 4 8 0 . 0 9 6 0 .1 2 1 0 . 1 2 3 0 . 2 8 8 0 . 2 3 7 0 . 1 7 9 0 . 2 4 6 0.041 0 . 0 8 1 0 . 0 2 6 8
7 5 0 0 .1 1 6 0 . 1 2 8 0.1 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 2 5 0 . 2 7 9 0 . 2 2 3 0 . 1 9 5 0 . 2 5 3 0 .03 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 1 8 5
4.2 S a m p le-lev el A tta ck  E x p erim en ts
4 .2 .1  B a se lin e  (Z ero-effort Im p o sto r  A tta ck ) R esu lts  and A n a ly s is
Table 4.3 shows the EER s1 of the nine verifier-template com binations and the 
EERs of “F ” verifier. To generate EERs in Table 4.3, we used Set II to  build the users 
tem plates and Set III to obtain genuine and zero-effort impostor scores. In Table 4.3, 
“F" verifier has three columns: 1) “Lowest E E R p ” gives the lowest, 2) “Avg. E E R p ” 
gives the average, and 3) “S T D p ” gives the  s tan d ard  deviation of E E R s obtained
with 126 different weight combinations.
1 Equal error ra te  (EER) or crossover error ra te  is the  point where false reject ra te  (FR R ) and 
impostor pass rate (IPR) curves intersect. To plot the F R R  and IP R  curves, we calculated a series 
of false reject rates and im postor pass rates by varying the  verification threshold  from 0 to  1 in 
increments of 0.001.
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Table 4.4 is similar to Table 4.3 except we used Set IV instead of Set III to 
generate impostor scores. (We used the same genuine scores to generate EERs in both 
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4). Our observations follow.
O b s e r v a t io n  1: For all M  values, the fusion ("F ") verifier outperform ed 
individual ("R ,” "S,” and "A” ) verifiers. See 'Low est E E R p ” and  "Avg. E E R p ” 
columns under "F” verifier in Tables 4.3 and 4.4.
O b s e r v a t io n  2: Irrespective of the  verifier, lowest EERs were achieved at 
higher M  values (e.g., 300, 350, 500, and 750) and a trade-off exists between M  and 
EERs (i.e., as M  increases, we can expect EERs to  decline).
O b s e r v a t io n  3: We com puted the  absolute difference between the  EER in 
each cell in Table 4.3 and the same cell in Table 4.4 (excluding cells of columns “Avg. 
E E R p ” and “S T D p ”). The average of absolute differences between EE R s in Table
4.3 and Table 4.4 is 0.00998. This means the EER, on average, changes by 0.00998 if 
the  im postors were from Set IV instead of Set III. This shows that E E R s  in Tables 
4-3 and 4-4, though obtained from  two different impostor populations, are not quite 
different.
In Table 4.5, eve give the to ta l num ber of genuine and im postor verification 
a ttem p ts  ex tracted  from Set III and Set IV to generate EERs in Tables 4.3 and  4.4. 
In Table 4.5, we also give the average number of keystrokes in a verification a ttem pt 
(includes genuine and zero-effort impostor) and the average time in seconds taken by 
the users to type a verification a ttem pt.
R eason  for not con sid erin g  m atch in g  pairs b eyon d  750: N ote from 
Table 4.5 th a t it took 14.83 seconds of typing time to generate a verification attem pt
T able 4.5: "Tot. Im postor A tte m p ts ’ and the  "Tot. Genuine A ttem pts" colum ns 
give the total number of impostor and genuine verification attem pts used to calculate 
EERs in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. "Avg. Typing Tim e per A ttem pt" colum n gives the 
average time taken to type a verification attem pt (in seconds). "Avg. #  of Keystrokes 
per Attempt" column gives the average number of keystrokes in a verification attem pt.
M
Tot. Impostor 
A ttem pts
Tot. Genuine 
A ttem pts
Avg. Typing 
Time (in sec.) 
per A ttem pt
Avg. #  of 
Keystrokes 
per A ttem pt
20 10950540 32630 14.83 54.65
40 5439610 16218 29.81 109.53
60 3596320 10715 44.65 163.98
80 2673265 7961 59.47 218.06
100 2119001 6320 74.27 272.03
120 1749125 5218 89.07 326.11
150 1379683 4114 111.24 406.72
300 640836 1918 221.11 805.63
350 530810 1579 257.62 937.49
500 342178 1018 364.24 1328.73
750 189141 564 547.56 2000.15
when M  =  20 and 547.56 seconds when M  = 750. Though all the  verifiers achieved 
lower EERs wdien M  =  750, it is im practical for a continuous verification system  to 
use 750 matching pairs, because for each verification attem pt, the verifier would have 
to wait for nearly 10 minutes. This is the reason why we did not consider beyond 750 
matching pairs in our experiments.
4 .2 .2  Snoop-forge-rep lay  A ttack  P a ra m eters  and  C on figu ration s
We considered four snoop-forge-replay a ttack  param eters for sample-level 
attacks. They are:
1) L en gth  o f  S n oop ed  T ext: is the  num ber of keystrokes for which the 
attacker steals hold and interval latencies from a victim. Depending on various factors, 
including attacker’s intent and victim ’s availability, the attacker can steal few or many
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keystrokes. We experim ented with snooped text of length 20. 50. 100. 200. 600. and 
1200 to see how this param eter impacts the  attack  performance.
For extracting N  snooped keystrokes from user U,. we used the first N  characters 
from U is typing sample in Set I. For example, when we snooped N  =  100 characters 
for user Uu we used the first 100 characters from U2's sample in Set I.
2) G aussian  P ertu rb a tio n  o f  S n o o p ed  L atencies: K eystroke dynam ics 
is a  behavioral tra it, so it is highly unlikely th a t two latencies of the  sam e key (for 
example, two hold latencies of “a” ) will be exactly equal, even if aa" was typed  in 
rapid  succession. From the  snooped keystrokes, assum e an a ttacker learns th a t the 
average key hold latency of “a” is 150ms. If the a ttacker creates a  forgery th a t has 
150ms for every occurrence of “a,” then th is artifact alone can expose the  forgery.
We solved the problem by adding Gaussian noise (zero mean and three standard  
deviations) to pertu rb  the latency values in a forgery. We chose Gaussian because its 
param eters (mean and standard deviation) are easy to estim ate and most programming 
languages can generate a  Gaussian variate. However, an attacker can also choose a 
different perturbation model {e.g., adding noise from uniform distribution), as long as 
the perturbation does not distort the latencies too much. We performed experim ents 
w ithout and with Gaussian perturbation.
3) F ilter in g  O utliers: From the snooped latencies, the attacker can choose 
to  remove outliers. We perform ed experim ents w ith and w ithout filtering outliers. 
W hen we filtered outliers, we discarded any latency greater th an  or equal to  300 
milliseconds.
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T a b le  4 .6 : Tw enty-four a ttack  configurations obtained with different param eter 
settings.
C on figuration
N u m b er
L ength  o f  
S nooped  
T ext
G au ssian
P ertu rb a tio n
F ilter in g
O utliers
M in. Freq. 
o f
O ccurren ce
1 20 YES YES 1
2 50 YES YES 1
3 100 YES YES 1
4 200 YES YES 1
5 600 YES YES 1
6 1200 YES YES 1
7 20 YES NO 1
8 50 YES NO 1
9 100 YES NO 1
10 200 YES NO 1
11 600 YES NO 1
12 1200 YES NO 1
13 20 NO YES 1
14 50 NO YES 1
15 100 NO YES 1
16 200 NO YES 1
17 600 NO YES
18 1200 NO YES
19 20 NO NO 1
20 50 NO NO 1
21 100 NO NO 1
22 200 NO NO 1
23 600 NO NO 2
24 1200 NO NO 3
4) M in im u m  F requency o f  D ig ra p h s in th e  S n o o p ed  T ext: In the
snooped tex t, if a latency (e.g., key hold of “a” ) appeared m ultiple tim es, we used 
its average in the forgery. To improve the forgery, the attacker can choose to use the 
snooped digraphs whose average latency was com puted w ith a t least k  repeats. For 
long snooped tex t lengths, i.e., 600 and 1200, we chose A; to be 2 and 3, respectively. 
However, for shorter lengths (20, 50, 100, and 200), we considered all the  digraphs 
regardless of how m any tim es they repeated; otherwise, we were left w ith too few 
digraphs to create a forgery.
Using the  above a ttack  param eters, we created  24 attack  configurations. (In 
Table 4.6, we list the  24 a ttack  configurations w ith their param eter values.) We
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T able 4.7: Average number of snoop-forge-replay attacks generated per user.
M A v g . N o . o f  “S n o o p -fo rg e-rep la y ” A ttack s p er  U ser
KI K P K H F
20 5594.98 5451.27 5325.65 4528.12
40 3448.91 3377.06 3149.48 2599.54
60 3105.98 3080.52 2946.57 2438.02
80 2839.48 2674.07 2639.32 2235.75
100 2401.59 2261.081 2233.64 1916.44
120 2012.78 1895.34 1872.46 1603.36
150 1526.72 1517.16 1498.85 1284.11
300 805.31 758.38 749.21 651.23
350 690.19 649.92 642.07 549.93
500 483.01 454.82 449.35 381.67
750 321.85 303.05 299.38 254.53
experim ented w ith  24 a ttack  configurations, 11 m atching pairs, and 10 different 
verifier-template pairs. This resulted in 2 4 x 1 1 x 1 0  =  2640 attack experim ents.
Table 4.7 gives the number of snoop-forge-replay attacks we generated against 
each user. Values in Table 4.7 represent averages calculated from all attacks generated 
by the 24 attack configurations and running A lgorithm  1 for 24 hours.
4 .2 .3  E ffectiven ess o f  th e  A ttack s
C om parison  o f a ttack  and baseline using error ra te p lo ts:  In Figure 
4.4, we compare the baseline (zero-effort) im postor pass rates with snoop-forge-replay 
attack pass rates. Panels (a), (b), (c), and (d) in Figure 4.4 show the error rate plots 
for “R,” “S,” “A ,” and “F” verifiers. In each panel, th e  two baseline IP R  curves 
correspond to zero-effort im postor attacks w ith Set III and Set IV, respectively. The 
24 attack  IPR  curves correspond to 24 a ttack  configurations.
Showing error rates for all verifier settings is not practical because we experi­
mented with 11 matching pairs and 10 verifier-template combinations, which gives 110
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settings. So. we chose to show plots corresponding to tlie setting in which a verifier 
had achieved its lowest baseline EER. (We highlighted th e  lowest baseline EE R s in 
b o ld  in Table 4.3).
Table 4.8 gives the maximum, minimum, and average attack EERs and baseline 
EERs corresponding to  the panels (a)-(cl) in F igure 4.4. Table 4.8 shows th a t the 
attack IPR s (in Figure 4.4) markedly increased the  EERs for verifiers which had the 
lowest EER s in our baseline experim ents. The results in Figure 4.4 and  Table 4.8 
also illustrate the unde discrepancy between the snoop-forge-replay a ttack  EERs and 
baseline EERs.
C o m p a r i s o n  o f  a t ta c k  a n d  b a se l in e  u s in g  E E R  p lo ts :  Here we
sum m arize how the  24 a ttack  configurations perform  against 10 verifier-tem plate 
combinations and 11 matching pair settings. In Figures 4.5 and 4.6, panels correspond 
to 10 verifier-template combinations. In each panel, we show the maximum, minimum, 
average, and s tandard  deviation (error bars) of a ttack  EER s and baseline EER s for 
11 m atching pair (M ) settings. The m axim um , m inim um , average, and  standard  
deviations of a ttack  EERs were com puted from EERs corresponding to  24 a ttack  
configurations. From the panels, we observe the following:
1) The “Maximum Attack EER” curves are remarkably higher than  zero-effort 
“Baseline EER ” curves (see Table 4.9 for percentage increase in attack  EERs over the 
baseline). This shows tha t all 11 matching pairs and 10 verifier-template combinations 
were vulnerable to the snoop-forge-replay attack;
2) T he fusion “F ” verifier (see Figure 4.6, panel (b)), which had  th e  lowest 
EERs in our baseline experiments has the highest maximum, minimum, and average
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A -K P  verifier, M = 500 *F’ verifier, M = 750
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-Attack IPRs
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0.2
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0.2 0.60.4 0.8
threshold
-Attack IPRs
0.6 - Baseline IPRs
0.4' -Baseline EERs
Baseline FRR
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
threshold
(c ) (d)
F ig u re  4 .4 : False reject rate (Baseline FRR), zero-effort, impostor pass rates (Baseline 
IPRs) (highlighted by the smaller circles), and 24 snoop-forge-replay attack  IP R  curves 
(highlighted by the large circles) achieved w ith “R ” (a), “S” (b), “A” (c) verifiers 
paired with KH, KI, and KP tem plates respectively and “F ” (d) verifier. In each plot, 
the Baseline EERs (crossover points between Baseline FR R  and Baseline IP R  curves) 
are marked by a box.
attack  EERs. This dem onstrates th a t the  best perform ing verifier under zero-effort 
attacks could turn  out to be the most vulnerable verifier under a non-zero effort attack;
3) The m axim um  and m inim um  a ttack  E E R  curves and error bars indicate 
th a t some attack  configurations are more effective than  the  others. In Section 4.2.4, 
we discuss which attack configurations are more effective; and
4) The “Minimum Attack EER ,; curves show that, even for the worst performing 
attack configurations, the “R .” “A ,” and “F ” verifiers had considerably high attack
EERs compared to  their baseline EERs.
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F ig u re  4.5: Maximum ( “Max. A ttack E E R ” curves), average ( “Avg. A ttack E E R ” 
curves), minimum ( “Min. Attack EER” curves), and standard deviations (Error bars) 
of attack  EERs achieved from 24 snoop-forge-replay a ttack  configurations against 
“R ” (a -  c), “S” (d -  f ) ,  “A” (g - h) verifiers and KI, K P, and KH tem plates. Two 
Baseline EER curves “Baseline EER (Set III)” and “Baseline EER (Set IV)” represent 
EERs from Tables 4.3 and 4.4. ( “Baseline E E R  (Set I I I ) ” and “Baseline E E R  (Set 
I V ) ” curves are overlapping in most panels.) Legends are the  sam e for panels (a) 
through (j).
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F igure 4.6: Maximum ( “Max. A ttack E E R ” curves), average ( “Avg. A ttack E E R ” 
curves), minimum ( “Min. Attack EER” curves), and standard deviations (Error bars) 
of attack EERs achieved from 24 snoop-forge-replay attack configurations against "A” 
(a) verifier and KH tem plate and “F ” (b) verifier. Two Baseline EER curves “Baseline 
EER (Set III)” and “Baseline EER (Set IV)” represent EERs from Tables 4.3 and 4.4. 
( “Baseline E E R (Set I I I ) ” and “Baseline E E R  (Set I V ) ” curves are overlapping in 
most panels.) Legends are the same for panels (a) through (j).
4 .2 .4  P erform ance A n a ly sis  o f  A tta ck  P aram eters
To observe the  perform ance of a ttack  param eters, in Figure 4.7, we give the 
a ttack  EER s of “R” (panels a and b), “S” (panels c and d), “A” (panels e and / ) ,  
and “F ” (panels g and h) verifiers configured w ith  750 m atching pairs and different 
a ttack  param eters. T he EER s w ith the  rem aining m atching pairs (40, 60, 80, 100, 
120, 150, 300, 350, and 500) behave the sam e way as th e  panels in F igure 4.7. See 
Appendix B for the EE R  plots with the rem aining matching pairs.
In Figure 4.7, panels a, c, e, and g, “Filtering +  G aussian” (solid lines) 
correspond to configurations when the outliers were filtered, latencies were perturbed 
with Gaussian, and all snooped latencies were used to compute forgeries, irrespective 
of their frequency of occurrence. “No Filtering +  Gaussian” (dashed lines) correspond 
to similar settings except outliers were not filtered. In panels b, d, fi and h, “Filtering 
+  Min. Frequency” (solid lines) correspond to  configurations when the outliers were 
filtered, latencies were not perturbed w ith  G aussian, and only the  latencies th a t
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F ig u re  4 .7 : A ttack EERs under different attack configurations w ith “R ” (a -  6), “S” 
(c -  d), “A” (e -  / ) ,  and “F ” (g -  h) verifiers. EERs are com puted using M  =  750. 
Solid lines represent a ttack  EERs when the  outliers are filtered and the  dashed lines 
represent attack  EERs when the  outliers are not filtered.
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T ab le  4 .8 : A tt nek EERs of the top performing verifier settings in baseline experiments.
Verifier
Baseline 
EERs 
(Set III & IV)
M aximum
A ttack
EER
Minimum
Attack
EER
Average
A ttack
EER
R KH. M  = 500 0.116. 0.096 0.837 0.673 0.81
S KI. M  =  300 0.124. 0.116 0.742 0.224 0.514
A KP, M  =  500 0.187. 0.179 0.811 0.429 0.618
F, M  =  750 0.032. 0.03 0.965 0.679 0.905
occurred more than once in the  snooped tex t were used to  compute forged latencies. 
“No Filtering -f Min. Frequency’" (dashed lines) correspond to similar settings except 
outliers were not filtered. O ur observations follow.
1) Forgeries using short snooped te x t of 20 to  100 characters achieved very 
high EERs ranging from lowest 0.43 (with “A-KH” in Figure 4 .7(f))  to  highest 0.92 
(with “F ” in Figure 4.7(h)). However, th e  lim itation  w ith short snooped tex t is 
th a t it produces forgeries in which few characters repeat many tim es. Consequently, 
the forged tex t m ay contain misspelled words, linguistically m eaningless tex t, and 
gram m atical violations. However, given th a t  cu rren t keystroke-based continuous 
verification system s do not im pose any checks on the  te x t typed by the  user, the 
forgeries created with short snooped text are still effective.
In panels (c) and (e) in Figure 4.7, note th a t as the  snooped length increases, 
the attacks become less effective against "S” and “A” verifiers. We explain why this 
happens in Section 4.2.6.
2) Overall, we achieved higher a ttack  EER s, ranging from lowest 0.43 (w ith 
“A-KH” in Figure 4.7(f)) to  highest 0.965 (with “F” in Figure 4.7(h)), when the outliers 
in the snooped tex t were filtered, latencies were not perturbed w ith  G aussian noise,
55
T a b le  4 .9 : Minimum to maximum percentage increa.se in attack EERs over baseline 
EERs across all the matching pairs.
Max. A ttack 
EER
Avg. A ttack 
EER
Min. A ttack 
EER
Baseline (Set III) 125.5% to% 
2915.62%
69.33% to  
2730.55
12.84% to 
2075.41%
Baseline (Set IV) 128.8% to 3116.67%.
71.89% to  
2919.26%
18.51% to 
2220.44%
and only the latencies tha t occurred more than once in the  snooped tex t were used to 
compute forged latencies. A ttack EERs corresponding to these param eters are shown 
as solid curves in panels b, d, f, and h in Figure 4.7.
In comparison, we achieved lower attack  EERs, ranging from the  lowest 0.21 
(w ith “S-K P” in Figure 4.7(c)) to  highest 0.932 (w ith “F ” in F igure 4.7(g)), when 
the outliers were not filtered, latencies were perturbed w ith Gaussian, and all snooped 
latencies were used to compute forgeries, irrespective of their frequency of occurrence. 
A ttack EERs corresponding to these param eters are shown as dashed curves in panels 
a, c, e, and g in Figure 4.7.
4 .2 .5  A n a ly s is  o f  A ttacks A g a in st th e  “R ” V erifier
In the solid curves of Figure 4.7(a), note the  drop in EERs when the  snooped 
tex t lengths are 20, 50, and 100. W hen we used, 1) 20, 50, and 100 snooped tex t 
lengths, 2) Gaussian perturbation , and 3) outlier filtering, we achieved lower attack  
EERs with :tR” verifier. This occurred because the normalized disorder score (see :‘R" 
verifier, Section 3.6, Page 34) is sensitive to  the size of A train and A test. We explain 
w ith the following example.
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Assume A tr(un and A tf st contain five digraphs. If there is one mismatch between 
A tl,nn and A ttst. it means 40% or two out of the  five digraphs do not have the same 
rank. This gives a normalized disorder score of 0.166C7. Now, assume A train and A test 
contain 20 digraphs. One mismatch between A train and A test leads to having two out of 
20 (or 10%) digraphs that do not have the same rank. This gives a normalized disorder 
score of 0.01. So, even if A train and A test have the sam e num ber of m ism atches, the 
normalized disorder between A train and A test is higher when the array sizes are lower.
Filtering outliers from snooped tex ts of length 20, 50, and 100 decreased the 
size of A train and A test arrays. G aussian pertu rbation  fu rther increased the  disorder 
score. The two param eters together increased the normalized disorder score between 
the tem plate and the forgery and thus lowered the attack  EERs. However, EERs for 
snooped tex t of lengths 200, 600, and 1200 were high in spite of adding G aussian 
perturbation because the arrays were large even after outlier filtering.
W hen the  outliers were not filtered, the size of th e  arrays were large for all
snooped text lengths. So the attack EERs were high for all snooped text lengths (see
dashed curves in Figures 4.7(a) and 4.7(b)). Therefore, except when we perform ed
both  Gaussian pertu rbation  and outlier filtering w ith snooped tex t of length 20, 50,
and 100, the attack EERs for “R” verifier were high for all configurations.
4 .2 .6  A n a lysis  o f  A ttack s A g a in st “S ” and “A ” V erifiers
In Figures 4.7(c) and 4.7(e), we observe tha t the attack EERs decreased as the 
snooped tex t length increased. The reason why EERs decreased when snooped text 
length increased is related to  the d istribu tion  of digraphs in English tex t. In Figure 
4.8, we show the  probability d is tribu tion  of the  digraphs. To plot the  d istribution ,
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F ig u re  4 .8 : Probability distribution of English digraphs. Probabilities were computed 
from the digraph frequencies given in [44],
we used digraph frequencies in [44], which calculated the  frequencies by considering 
997,380 digraph instances. In Figure 4.8, notice th a t the  first few digraphs cover a 
m ajor portion of the probability distribution compared w ith the rest of the digraphs. 
In fact, the  40 most frequent digraphs account for 50.71% of all digraph instances. 
So, when the snooped tex t is long (600 and  1200 characters), th e  m ajority  of the 
digraphs occur only once. For example, from the  d istribution  shown in Figure 4.8, 
if the snooped tex t has 600 digraphs, out of the  676 possible English digraphs, we 
can expect only 94 digraphs to occur m ore th an  once in the snooped tex t and the 
rem aining 582 digraphs either occur once or do not occur at all.
For the digraphs that, occurred only once in the snooped tex t, we used a  single 
snooped latency value in the forgery. This latency value could have been an inaccurate 
estim ate of the “tru e” latency value. D uring the  attack , when we replayed single 
latency values, the majority of the digraphs were considered “invalid” by the “S” and 
“A” verifiers. This lowered the attack EERs.
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We m itigated the  problem  by replaying only those* digraph latencies th a t 
occurred a t least two or three times in the  snooped tex t. This gave us a b e tte r 
estim ate of the mean of the victim user's latencies, and as a result, the forgery had a 
be tte r chance of being considered as “valid.” In the  right side panels (b. d. /. and h) 
of F igure 4.7, with 600 characters snooped tex t, we used latencies of those digraphs 
th a t occurred a t least twice and with 1200 characters, we used digraphs tha t occurred 
a t least thrice. Consequently, from Figures 4.7(d) and 4.7(f), we see th a t the attack  
EERs are high a t 600 and 1200 snooped tex t lengths.
A ttack EERs increased when we filtered the  outliers in the  snooped tex t. In
Figures 4 .7(e)-4.7(f), the  solid curve's (which represent filtering outliers) an* above
their corresponding dashed curves (which represent no outlier filtering). By filtering
the  outliers we were able to  forge latencies th a t  were closer to  th e  victim  user’s
latencies, and therefore, were able to increase the  a ttack  pass rates.
4 .2 .7  A n a ly sis  o f A tta ck s A g a in st th e  “F ” V erifier
The “F ” verifier, which had the  lowest EERs against zero-effort im postor 
a ttacks had surprisingly high a ttack  EERs. From Figures 4.7(g) and 4.7(h), we 
observe the  following: as in “R ,” the  EE R s for “F ” verifier were high for all a ttack  
configurations. A contributing  factor for th is is th a t  the  “R” verifier was weighted 
more in the t;F” verifier.
In Figures 4.7(g) and 4.7(h), the solid curves are over the dashed curves, which 
shows th a t filtering the outliers increased the a ttack  EERs. In Figure 4.7(g), at a few 
points the  dashed curves are over the  solid curves when the snooped tex t length is
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sh o rt. This indicates the influence of "IT' verifier, which had lower a ttack  EERs for 
short snooped text with Gaussian perturbation  and outlier filtering.
C H A P T E R  5 
C O N C L U S IO N S  A N D  F U T U R E  W O R K
In th is d issertation, we presented a  new a ttack  called “snoop-forge-replay” 
attack  th a t synthesizes keystroke forgeries using tim ing inform ation stolen from 
victim users. Our results from feature-level and 2640 sample-level attack  experiments 
(involving 150 users, four state-of-the-art continuous verifiers, three types of keystroke 
latencies, and 24 attack configurations) reveal th a t snoop-forge-replay attacks are very 
effective in increasing EERs. W ith 20 to 1200 snooped keystrokes, the average sample- 
level snoop-forge-replay a ttack  EER s were between 0.487 and 0.912. In comparison, 
the baseline EERs w ith zero-effort im postor a ttacks were between 0.03 and 0.285 
(i.e., the  a ttack  increased EE R s from between 69.33% to  2730.55%). O ur results 
additionally show th a t effective keystroke forgeries can be created w ith  a) as low as 
20 to 100 characters of snooped tex t and b) old legacy keystroke tim ing information.
The main reason for the success of snoop-forge-replay attack is th a t keystroke- 
based continuous verification m ethods solely rely on users' latency information, which 
can be easily forged, as dem onstrated in this dissertation. We opine th a t by integrating 
text-based and language-based tra its  into the verification process such as -  1) the 
rate at which a  user misspells words or repeats letters, 2) type of words for which the 
user has latency outliers, 3) how the  user revises tex t i.e., revision p a tte rn , and so
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6 1
on. the im pact of the attack  can be m itigated. In our fu ture work, we will pursue 
the problem of designing keystroke based verification system s tha t are resilient to 
snoop-forge-replay attacks.
A P P E N D IX  A
A D D R E S S E S  O F W E B  P A G E S  U S E D  A S “D U M M Y  T E X T ”
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W eb ad d resses o f  20 W ik ip ed ia  pages used  in our "dum m y te x t” file
1. en. Wikipedia. org/wiki/Htstory_of- Um tedStates
2. en. Wikipedia. org/wiki/World- W a rJ I
3. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air-warfare-of- World- War-II
4. en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Effects-of- World- W a r J I
5. en. wikipedia. org/wiki/ United-Nations
6. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World- W a r J
7. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Causes-of1 World_ War A
8. en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Cold_ War
9. en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Great-Pyramid-oj1 Giza
10. en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Stonehenge
11. en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Colosseum
12. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_ WalLof-China
13. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War-on-Terror
14. en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Gulf1 War
15. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam- War
16. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand-Canyon
17. en. wikipedia. org /w iki/  Christopher-Columbus
18. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert-Einstein
19. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isaac-Newton
20. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NASA
A P P E N D IX  B
E E R  P L O T S U N D E R  D IF F E R E N T  A T T A C K  C O N F IG U R A T IO N S
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F ig u re  B . l :  Com parison of a ttack  EER s using a ttack  configurations 1-12 (plots 
a, c) and a ttack  configurations 13-24 (plots b, d) for "R” verifier. Refer the  Table
4.6 to see the param eter values used in each configuration. The solid lines represent 
attack EERs when the outliers are filtered and the dashed lines represent a ttack  EERs 
when the outliers are not filtered. Plots a and b correspond to M  =  40, plots c and d 
correspond to  M  = 60.
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F ig u re  B .2 : Comparison of a ttack  EER s using a ttack  configurations 1-12 (plots 
a. c) and a ttack  configurations 13-24 (plots b, d) for "R" verifier. Refer the  Table
4.6 to  see the param eter values used in each configuration. The solid lines represent 
attack EERs when the outliers are filtered and the dashed lines represent attack  EERs 
when the outliers are not filtered. Plots a and b correspond to M  =  80. plots c and d 
correspond to M  =  100.
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F ig u re  B .3 : Comparison of attack  EERs using attack  configurations 1-12 (plots a, 
c) and attack configurations 13-24 (plots b, d ) for “R” verifier. Refer the Table 4.6 to 
see the param eter values used in each configuration. The solid lines represent attack  
EERs when the outliers are filtered and the dashed lines represent attack EERs when 
the  outliers are not filtered. P lots a and b correspond to  M  = 120, p lots c and  d 
correspond to M  = 150.
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F ig u re  B .4 : Comparison of attack EERs using attack  configurations 1—12 (plots a, 
c) and attack configurations 13-24 (plots b, d) for “R” verifier. Refer the Table 4.6 to 
see the param eter values used in each configuration. The solid lines represent attack 
EERs when the outliers are filtered and the dashed lines represent attack EERs when 
the  outliers are not filtered. Plots a and b correspond to  AI =  300, plots c and  d 
correspond to M  =  350.
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F ig u re  B .5 : Com parison of a ttack  EERs using a ttack  configurations 1-12 (plots 
a) and attack  configurations 13-24 (plots b) for "R.” verifier. Refer the Table 4.6 to 
see the  param eter values used in each configuration. The solid lines represent attack 
EERs when the outliers are filtered and the dashed lines represent attack EERs when 
the outliers are not filtered. P lots correspond to M  =  500.
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F ig u re  B .6 : Com parison of a ttack  EERs using a ttack  configurations 1-12 (plots 
a, c) and a ttack  configurations 13-24 (plots b, d) for “S” verifier. Refer the  Table
4.6 to  see the param eter values used in each configuration. The solid lines represent 
attack EERs when the outliers are filtered and the dashed lines represent attack EERs 
when the outliers are not filtered. Plots a and b correspond to M  =  40, plots c and d 
correspond to  M  = 60.
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F ig u re  B .7 : Com parison of a ttack  EERs using a ttack  configurations 1-12 (plots 
a, c) and a ttack  configurations 13-24 (plots b, d ) for “S” verifier. Refer the  Table
4.6 to see the param eter values used in each configuration. The solid lines represent 
attack EERs when the outliers are filtered and the dashed lines represent attack EERs 
when the outliers are not filtered. Plots a and b correspond to M  =  80, plots c and d 
correspond to  M  = 100.
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F ig u re  B .8 : Comparison of attack  EERs using a ttack  configurations 1-12 (plots a, 
c) and attack configurations 13-24 (plots b, d) for “S” verifier. Refer the Table 4.6 to 
see the param eter values used in each configuration. The solid lines represent attack 
EERs when the outliers are filtered and the dashed lines represent attack EERs when 
the  outliers are not filtered. P lots a and b correspond to  M  =  120, p lo ts c and  d 
correspond to M  =  150.
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F ig u re  B .9 : Comparison of a ttack  EERs using attack  configurations 1—12 (plots a, 
c) and attack configurations 13-24 (plots b, d) for “S” verifier. Refer the Table 4.6 to 
see the param eter values used in each configuration. The solid lines represent attack 
EERs when the outliers are filtered and the dashed lines represent attack EERs when 
the  outliers are not filtered. P lots a and b correspond to  M  =  300, p lots c and  d 
correspond to M  =  350.
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F ig u re  B .10 : Com parison of a ttack  EE R s using a ttack  configurations 1-12 (plots 
a) and attack  configurations 13-24 (plots b) for “S” verifier. Refer the  Table 4.6 to 
see the param eter values used in each configuration. The solid lines represent attack 
EERs when the outliers are filtered and the dashed lines represent attack EERs when 
the outliers are not filtered. Plots correspond to  M  =  500.
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(d)
F ig u re  B . l l :  Com parison of attack  EERs using a ttack  configurations 1-12 (plots 
a, c,) and a ttack  configurations 13-24 (plots b, d) for “A” verifier. Refer th e  Table
4.6 to  see the  param eter values used in each configuration. The solid lines represent 
attack EERs when the outliers are filtered and the dashed lines represent attack EERs 
when the outliers are not filtered. Plots a and b correspond to M  — 40, plots c and d 
correspond to  M  =  60.
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F ig u re  B .1 2 : Comparison of a tta ck  EER s using a ttack  configurations 1-12 (plots 
a, c,) and a ttack  configurations 13-24 (plots b, d ) for “A” verifier. Refer th e  Table
4.6 to  see the  param eter values used in each configuration. The solid lines represent 
attack EERs when the outliers are filtered and the dashed lines represent attack EERs 
when the outliers are not filtered. P lots a and b correspond to M  =  80, plots c and d 
correspond to  M  = 100.
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F ig u re  B .1 3 : Comparison of attack EERs using attack configurations 1-12 (plots a, 
c) and attack configurations 13-24 (plots b, d) for “A” verifier. Refer the Table 4.6 to 
see the param eter values used in each configuration. The solid lines represent attack  
EERs when the outliers are filtered and the dashed lines represent attack EERs when 
the outliers are not filtered. P lo ts a and b correspond to  M  =  120, p lots c and d 
correspond to  M  = 150.
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(d)
F ig u re  B .14 : Comparison of attack EERs using attack configurations 1-12 (plots a, 
c) and attack configurations 13-24 (plots b, d ) for “A” verifier. Refer the Table 4.6 to 
see the param eter values used in each configuration. The solid lines represent attack  
EERs when the outliers are filtered and the dashed lines represent attack EERs when 
the  outliers are not filtered. P lo ts a and b correspond to  M  =  300, plots c and  d 
correspond to  M  =  350.
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F ig u re  B .15 : Com parison of a ttack  E E R s using a ttack  configurations 1-12 (plots 
a) and a ttack  configurations 13-24 (plots b) for “A” verifier. Refer the Table 4.6 to 
see the param eter values used in each configuration. The solid lines represent attack  
EERs when the outliers are filtered and the dashed lines represent attack EERs when 
the outliers are not filtered. Plots correspond to M  = 500.
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F ig u re  B .16 : Com parison of a ttack  EERs using a ttack  configurations 1-12 (plots 
a, c) and attack  configurations 13-24 (plots b. d ) for “F" verifier. Refer the  Table
4.6 to  see the  param eter values used in each configuration. The solid lines represent 
attack EERs when the outliers are filtered and the dashed lines represent attack EERs 
when the outliers are not filtered. Plots a and b correspond to M  = 40, plots c and d 
correspond to  M  — 60.
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F ig u re  B .1 7 : Com parison of a ttack  EER s using a ttack  configurations 1-12 (plots 
a, c) and  a ttack  configurations 13-24 (plots b, d) for “F :: verifier. Refer the  Table
4.6 to  see the  param eter values used in each configuration. The solid lines represent 
attack EERs when the outliers are filtered and the dashed lines represent attack EERs 
when the outliers are not filtered. Plots a and b correspond to M  = 80, plots c and d 
correspond to  M  = 100.
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F ig u re  B .1 8 : Comparison of attack EERs using attack configurations 1-12 (plots a, 
c) and attack configurations 13-24 (plots b, d ) for “F ” verifier. Refer the Table 4.6 to 
see the param eter values used in each configuration. The solid lines represent attack 
EERs when the outliers are filtered and the dashed lines represent attack EERs when 
the  outliers are not filtered. P lo ts a and b correspond to  M  =  120, p lo ts  c and d 
correspond to  M  = 150.
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(d)
F ig u re  B .19 : Comparison of attack EERs using attack configurations 1-12 (plots a, 
c) and attack configurations 13-24 (plots b, d) for “F” verifier. Refer the Table 4.6 to 
see the param eter values used in each configuration. T he solid lines represent attack  
EERs when the outliers are filtered and the dashed lines represent attack EERs when 
the outliers are not filtered. P lo ts a and b correspond to  M  =  300, p lots c and  d 
correspond to  M  = 350.
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F ig u re  B .20 : Com parison of attack  E E R s using a ttack  configurations 1—12 (plots 
a) and attack  configurations 13-24 (plots b) for “F ” verifier. Refer the  Table 4.G to  
see the param eter values used in each configuration. The solid lines represent attack  
EERs when the outliers are filtered and the dashed lines represent attack EERs when 
the outliers are not filtered. Plots correspond to M  =  500.
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